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Abstract
This study examines the evolution of the United States (U.S.) economy
after 1999, extending our previous studies [4, 8] up to 2007. The U.S.
economy has moved steadily toward services and information-intensive
sectors in terms of Gross National Product (GNP), employment, and
wage distribution. Information-intensive services, the nexus of these two
major trends, now compose the largest portion of the U.S. economy in
terms of GNP value, jobs, and wages. In addition, we study the growth
of international trade in services and information sectors, which is likely
to become increasingly important in the future. Finally, we examine the
factors underlying the shifts observable in the economy and the impact
on competition, strategy, and sector structure.
An online technical appendix that discusses the definitions and conceptual framework,
and describes the data sources and the detailed calculations used to measure the size




Most of the large economies in the world are already dominated by
services, in that services compose more than 50% of national income.
We are now in the midst of another major evolutionary trend: that
from a material or physical to an information economy. This change is
most visible in developed economies, but is occurring in all economies.
Some of the research studies that have examined, established, and mea-
sured this trend for the United States (U.S.) are those by Machlup [60],
Porat [73], Apte and Nath [8], and Apte et al. [4]. Choi et al. [32], fol-
lowing the same methodology as Apte and Nath, demonstrate that a
similar evolution has taken place in South Korea, which, while having
a relatively larger manufacturing sector than the U.S., was also effec-
tively an information economy by 2000 and has continued to trend in
that direction until 2005.
In this monograph, we explore the confluence of these two trends by
examining the double dichotomy of products versus services and infor-
mation versus material (noninformation), which divides the economy
into four supersectors. Figure 1.1 provides some illustrative examples
of industries in the four supersectors. Note that certain physical man-



































Fig. 1.1 A 2 × 2 decomposition of the U.S. economy with sector examples.
information sector following the definition by Porat [73]. It also should
be pointed out that many industries do not really lie entirely inside one
cell. For example, both Machlup and Porat arrived at nearly identical
conclusions about the health care industry: It breaks down just about
evenly across the material and information sectors.
In previous articles, we have examined the way in which Gross
National Product (GNP) in the U.S. divides across these sectors using
data on U.S. GNP from 1967, 1992, and 1997 [4]. The current arti-
cle revisits the earlier estimates and extends them to 2007. Since we
examine data across several years, we are also able to look at the
changes during that period. Our analysis of the broad changes in the
U.S. economy uses sector-level data organized by the Standard Indus-
trial Classification (SIC) and North American Industrial Classification
System (NAICS) codes.
We also examine the evolution of jobs and wages in the U.S. This
is different from the GNP studies and gives a more detailed perspec-
tive. Wages are a major part of GNP but are not exactly the same.
Also, the number of jobs can and do distribute differently across the
economy, since average wage rates differ substantially across sectors.
Furthermore, the GNP data are aggregated at the level of SIC/NAICS
codes. But in fact, companies and jobs often cut across the boundaries
4 Introduction
of the supersectors we are examining. The data on jobs and wages thus
present a different perspective and at a finer level of resolution. We ana-
lyze data on the U.S. job market (employment and wages by more than
800 occupational categories) since 1999 and extended up to 2007. One
major finding is that information workers in services now account for
the largest share of total U.S. jobs. This is a significant change from the
historical pattern, where noninformation workers in services were the
largest segment of the labor market. This shift occurred around 2000.
In addition, information workers in services had already captured the
largest share of the total wage bill by 1999, and this pattern has con-
tinued. Interestingly, the highest average wage rate is for information
workers in products, and that has been the case for more than a decade,
although the total wage bill is much larger for other segments of the
labor market.
In short, it is fair to say that the U.S. economy is now an “informa-
tion economy” in terms of GNP, jobs, and wages. What is more, the
largest component of the U.S. economy is now “information-intensive
services.” While the economic crises in the last decade have resulted in
some moderation of these trends, we can expect continued movement
in the same direction in the near future.
This transformation to information and information-intensive
services has a wide array of consequences. In this study, we exam-
ine some of these consequences to indicate the substantial implica-
tions for both management and policy decisions. First, the economics
of information-intensive sectors are different in certain specific ways
that affect competition. Entry barriers are low, and simple economies
of scale are less pronounced. Physical location is less of a differentia-
tor. All of these tend to make competition more intense. On the other
hand, barriers like network externalities can have the opposite effect.
Furthermore, there may be opportunities for finding niche audiences.
While trade in services is generally difficult due to their intangibility,
trade in content-based services and even transactional services is now
feasible. There are many other structural implications for economies.
One systematic phenomenon is the de-integration occurring in many
verticals such as music and publishing. Another is the appearance of
mechanisms such as open sourcing and of direct exchange and barter,
5which can create a kind of “demonetization” effect. Finally, the struc-
tural changes extend below the sector level down to organizations and
even jobs and tasks.
In the next section, we review research on the information economy
in the U.S. and survey the literature on related topics. In Sections 3
and 4, we present the main results of our study, in terms of the two-way
breakdown of the U.S. economy based on GNP data (as in Figure 1.1)
and labor statistics. In Section 5, we present the changing patterns
of international trade in information services. The GNP data over a
40-year period show the significant trends noted above. In Section 6,
we discuss possible reasons for these trends. Productivity increases have
long been recognized as a cause for the growth of services relative to
manufacturing. We suggest that they are also the reason for the growth
of information-intensive services relative to physical services. Under-
lying productivity changes are a range of management actions that
we describe collectively as a process of “industrialization,” having a
close analogy to the historical industrialization process associated with
manufacturing. We analyze the consequences of industrialization for
information-intensive services in Section 7. The monograph concludes




Literature and History of Research
There is a substantial amount of research covering a wide range of
disciplines that examine various aspects of the information economy.1
These are mostly microlevel studies. Most recent macrolevel studies on
the information economy or the so-called “new economy” (for example,
[14, 41, 44, 78]) seem to have focused on the contribution of information
and communications technologies (ICT) to faster labor productivity
growth in the late 1990s. However, the number of studies that attempt
to present a macro profile by quantifying the size, structure, and growth
of the information economy in the U.S. has been relatively small.
Understandably, there are formidable issues in measuring the infor-
mation economy. Nevertheless, it is important to have an idea of its
approximate size relative to the overall economy because of the way
the role of information in modern economies has been described. For
example, Martin [64] argues that, in developed economies, information
1The ways that information is conceptualized vary across disciplines. Even within a dis-
cipline, there are differences among scholars about how information is conceived and, as
a result, how its larger impact in society has been analyzed. Schement and Curtis [76]
discuss various conceptualizations from across disciplines to examine the ascendance of
the idea of information throughout history and to discuss its role in the emergence of the
so-called information society.
6
7holds “the key to growth, output, and employment,” a role that was
played in the past by traditional factors of production like land, labor,
and capital in the industrial society.
The most formidable challenge in obtaining a comprehensive
measure of the information economy is to separate “information” from
the “material” component of the economy. The seminal contributions
of Machlup [60, 61] and Porat [73] describe methods for measuring the
information or knowledge component of the total value generated in
the economy. Fritz Machlup’s 1962 study is one of the first attempts to
assess what he calls the “knowledge industry” and to present a com-
prehensive statistical profile of this industry. His study provides a con-
ceptual framework for research into quantitative as well as qualitative
aspects of knowledge-based information activities. It identifies the com-
ponents of the “knowledge industry” and measures its contribution to
the GNP. According to Machlup, 29% of the U.S. GNP was generated
by the knowledge industry in 1958. Subsequently, in the three published
volumes of his unfinished series Knowledge: Its Creation, Distribution
and Economic Significance, Machlup further explains his concepts and
presents quantitative accounts of various aspects of the U.S. knowledge
economy.2
In 1977, Marc Porat undertook an extensive study of information-
based activities in the U.S. economy on behalf of the U.S. Department
of Commerce.3 Porat uses a conceptual framework similar to that of
Machlup. However, to define and measure the information economy,
Porat adopts an approach that is quite distinct from the one used by
Machlup. He follows strictly the national income accounting framework.
Machlup, on the other hand, includes a number of economic activities
that are not part of the national income accounts. Machlup’s approach
would require a new system of national accounting if one wanted to ana-
lyze the information sector as the “knowledge industry” a la Machlup,
within the broader concept of the national economy. Porat recognizes
Machlup’s innovation and its novelty but justifies his stance in using
2Machlup originally planned a series of 10 volumes highlighting different aspects of the
knowledge economy. However, he could publish only three volumes before his untimely
demise.
3This study uses data for 1967.
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conventional national income accounting framework: “the concept of an
information sector was sufficiently new that a simultaneous overhaul of
the GNP scheme would confuse and obfuscate more than it would help”
[73, vol. 1, p. 45]. Moreover, it is much easier to compile and manipu-
late data using Porat’s method (rather than using Machlup’s) since it
makes use of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National Income
Accounts. However, it has its limitations. Because the BEA data are
collected and published at aggregate levels of industrial classification,
many of the information activities that can only be identified at a high
level of disaggregation are not included in Porat’s method.
Unfortunately, there have been only a few studies that implement
the methods developed by Machlup and Porat. Following Machlup’s
methodology, and as a sequel to his unfinished work, Huber and
Rubin [43] presented measurements of the knowledge industry for
the years when the U.S. Census Bureau conducted economic cen-
suses. These “census years” included 1963, 1967, 1972, 1977, and 1980.
Contrary to expectations of high growth in the knowledge industry as
predicted by Machlup in his 1962 study, Huber and Rubin [43] found
that its contribution to the U.S. GNP increased from 29% in 1958
to only about 34% in 1980. Furthermore, the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) [69, 70] used Porat’s
methodology to measure the size of the information economy in the U.S.
along with eight other member countries. The OECD study showed
that the share of the primary information sector (PRIS) (described
below) in the U.S. GNP increased from 19.6% in 1958 to 24.8% in 1972
[69], while the contribution of the secondary information sector (SIS)
increased from 23.1% in 1958 to 24.4% in 1972 [69]. In a more recent
study, Apte and Nath [8] reported that the share of all information
activities in total GNP grew from about 56% in 1992 to 63% in 1997.
They found that the PRIS accounted for 33% of GNP in 1992 and
about 35% in 1997. The GNP shares of the SIS were about 23% and
28% in 1992 and 1997, respectively.
Apte et al. [4] combined the material–information dichotomy with
the traditional product–service dichotomy to present another perspec-
tive on the structural changes that have been taking place in the
U.S. economy. This 2× 2 decomposition of the economy reveals that
9information services are the largest segment of the U.S. economy.4 By
1997, about 56% of total U.S. GNP was generated in this supersec-
tor. This share increased from about 36% in 1967 to 49% in 1992, and
subsequently to 56% in 1997.
Among other attempts to quantify information economy, the Cisco
Systems-sponsored research project on the Internet Economy, con-
ducted at the University of Texas–Austin [81], and the study on the
total value of private enterprise documents by Michael K. Bergman [20]
at BrightPlanet Corporation are noteworthy. However, both studies
lack a comprehensive conceptual framework that would make their esti-
mates comparable with conventional macroeconomic data. Recently,
the U.S. Census Bureau and the BEA have introduced a new defini-
tion of a separate information sector that includes selected publishing
activities, telecommunications, data processing services, radio, televi-
sion, motion pictures, and video, for which they collect and report data.
But this definition of information sector or economy is too restrictive,
does not match the Porat definition, and, in our opinion, does not ade-
quately reveal the importance of information in the economy today.5
As mentioned above, the more recent macro literature has focused
on the impact of ICT on the productivity growth in the U.S. After a
period of productivity slowdown since the 1970s, the rapid productivity
growth of the late 1990s in the U.S. — often referred to as “the U.S.
productivity revival” — attracted much attention from the researchers.
Most studies (for example, [14, 41, 44, 45, 46, 71, 78]) concluded that
the unprecedented advances in ICT explained a significant part of the
resurgence of U.S. productivity growth.6 Wolff [83] further showed that,
while computerization has a significant positive effect on total factor
4Apte and Nath [7] give a brief account of the shift of the U.S. economy toward information
services in the early 1990s.
5As Brynjolfsson and Saunders [26] argue, the GDP contributions of these industries do not
reflect their “oversized influence” on innovation. They argue that the effect of ICT “on the
economy goes far beyond its production. Indeed, the innovative use of technology by indi-
viduals, firms, and industries makes far more of a difference to the economy.” (pp. 15–16).
It is difficult to measure these outside effects. Furthermore, “technology is having another
large influence . . . in transactions that take place outside traditional markets.” (p. 21).
The conventional GDP measures exclude these transactions.
6However, there are differences among these studies as to the effects of ICT on productivity
at the sectoral level as well as to the sustainability of these effects.
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productivity, it was also strongly linked to occupational restructuring.
While these studies correctly documented the importance of ICT, they
failed to fully capture the effects of complementary innovations facili-
tated by “general purpose technologies” such as ICT.7 As Brynjolfsson
and Hitt [25] emphasized, “the economic contributions of general pur-
pose technologies are substantially larger than would be predicted by
simply multiplying the quantity of capital investment devoted to them
by a normal rate of return.” These complementary innovations came in
the form of organizational innovations such as new business processes,
new skills, and new organizational and industry structures. Although
the microeconomic studies of firms (for example, [23, 24] documented
the larger impact of ICT while taking into account these complemen-
tary innovations, the difficulty in quantifying and aggregating has made
it almost impossible to capture their impact at the macro level.
There are a few studies that examined employment patterns along
the information versus material (noninformation) dichotomy. Osberg
et al. [72] identified three broad occupational sectors within modern
advanced economies such as those of the U.S. and Canada: the goods
sector composed of occupations that directly involve the manipulation
or transformation of goods; the personal service sector consisting of
occupations that involve service to other individuals; and the informa-
tion sector involving the production or manipulation of symbolic infor-
mation. The information sector is further subdivided into two types of
occupations: the “data processors,” who are engaged in routine manip-
ulation, storage, and transfer of information within previously defined
categories (e.g., clerical work); and the “knowledge producers,” who
are engaged in the establishment of original categories or analyses (e.g.,
engineering or computer programming). They argued that the growth
of these three sectors could be explained by the inherent unbalanced
growth of the economy.8 According to them, labor productivity in goods
and data production grew steadily over time due to increasing capital
7Basu and Fernald [16] examine the productivity effects specific to the general-purpose
technology nature of ICT at the sectoral level for the U.S. economy.
8 In his seminal contribution to the growth literature, Baumol [17] first explains the concept
of unbalanced growth. Baumol [18] and Baumol et al. [19] further apply this concept to
explain low productivity growth and higher employment in services.
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intensity of production and the impact of ICT advances. In contrast,
labor productivity in the personal services and knowledge sectors did
not tend to increase over time, as labor time was the output in personal
services occupations, and the human creativity essential to knowledge
production demonstrated little tendency to increase over time. These
differences in productivity growth explained the relative increase in the
employment of personal service and knowledge workers. They analyzed
occupational data between 1960 and 1980 in the U.S. to demonstrate
a relative shift in employment toward knowledge-based occupations.
Using decennial census data on employment by detailed occupa-
tions and industries between 1950 and 2000, Wolff [84] extended this
analysis and found that information workers (knowledge producers and
data processors) increased from 37% of the workforce in 1950 to 59%
in 2000 in the U.S. His analysis further showed that the growth of
information workers was not attributable to a change in tastes for
information-intensive goods and services, but partially to changes in
production technologies that made it possible to substitute goods and
service workers for information workers, and partly to differential rates
of productivity movements among the industries of the economy, thus
fitting the framework of unbalanced growth. Apte et al. [4] also exam-
ined employment and wages among information and noninformation
workers in the product and service sectors; however, their analysis
was based on data for 1999 only. Their classifications of information
worker and noninformation worker were different from those proposed
by Porat [73] or Osberg et al. [72] and were more akin to the classifi-
cations used in the current study.
The articles included in Cortada [36] present a broader account by
combining historical, economic, and sociological perspectives on the
rise of the “knowledge workers” — the fastest growing segment of the
workforce in the world today.9 This volume made some very interesting
observations. For example, knowledge workers first and foremost came
into being where technologies were most advanced. Further, the shift
to knowledge work began in earnest before World War I and, by the
end of the 1920s, became a major trend. They noted that the ability of
9A knowledge worker is defined as a person who deals in data and ideas.
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women to work in professional careers was made possible mainly by the
rise of knowledge work, rather than through any altruistic change in
the attitude of male managers. Freeman [38] further discussed various
labor market outcomes of ICT extension to economic activity.
Studies on the employment of information or knowledge workers
can also be related to a recent literature that focused on the increas-
ing wage gap between low-skilled and high-skilled workers. Skill-biased
technological innovation has been shown to be the most plausible expla-
nation of this development. For example, Autor et al. [11, 12] argued
that the increased use of computers (which is used as a proxy for skill-
biased technological change) and skill upgrading accounted for growth
in demand for and wages of skilled workers. Autor et al. [11, 12, 13],
Autor [10], and Acemoglu and Autor [1] further explored the rela-
tionship between technological change and employment and earnings
of skilled (information) workers. Berman et al. [21] and Machin and
Reenen [59] examined empirical evidence for skill-biased technolog-
ical change for several advanced countries, including the U.S., and
established that skill-biased technological progress had increased the
demand for skilled workers. Focusing on IT professionals, Mithas and
Krishnan [66] further documented that investment in human capital
and IT intensity of firms led to substantially higher compensation for
these workers.
Related to this literature but considered from the operations man-
agement perspective, Apte and Mason [6] and recently Mithas and
Whitaker [67] focused on global disaggregation of information-intensive
services. Apte and Mason [6] developed a classification framework
to identify the services and jobs that were most amenable to ser-
vice disaggregation. Building on this classification scheme, Mithas and
Whitaker [67] proposed and empirically validated a theory of service
disaggregation, which argued that a service with high information-
intensity jobs was relatively more amenable for disaggregation. They
also found that high information-intensity occupations that required
higher skill levels had experienced higher employment growth but
a decline in salary growth. Furthermore, occupations with a higher
need for physical presence also had experienced higher employment
growth and lower wage growth. However, the scope of these changes in
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production and delivery of services (particularly information-intensive
services) was far greater than just spatial disaggregation of the
supply chain, as noted by Karmarkar [47].10 This line of research cre-
ated a burgeoning literature on so-called “service industrialization.”
Karmarkar [48, 49] discussed the link between the global information
economy and service industrialization.
It is apparent that the structural shift toward an information or
knowledge economy requires a new policy framework. Although ICT
advances have facilitated this structural shift, it is ICT- enabled inno-
vations that have had and will continue to have the greatest impact
on the evolving nature of the broad changes. For sustained economic
growth and development, countries will have to pay attention to for-
mulating and implementing effective innovation policies. Ezell and
Atkinson [37] discussed various aspects of innovation policies for the
U.S. to gain competitive advantage in the twenty-first century. In the
information economy, the emerging occupation and employment struc-
tures also will necessitate new policies on education and employment.
Kay and Greenhill [54] discussed the need for education policies that
will help build skills for the emerging labor market in the twenty-first
century. However, the need for a new policy paradigm may go beyond
the conventional realms of economics. The recognition of the fact that
a broadly defined concept of information or/and knowledge has come
to play a critical role, not only in our everyday economic life but also
in shaping the current and future paths of our social, political, and
cultural life, extends the scope of this policy framework to a more
comprehensive paradigm. A series of articles included in Hearn and
Rooney [42] discussed the concept and discourse on knowledge beyond
science and technology and thus argued that there was a need for a
much broader knowledge policy framework that covered a wide range
of issues relevant for the twenty-first century.
10Chase and Apte [31] discuss the evolution of service operations from a historical perspec-
tive and identify the big ideas around which major changes have taken place.
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The U.S. Information Economy
In this section, we present empirical evidence to document a long-run
structural change that has taken place in the U.S. The share of infor-
mation services in the overall economy has been growing for over four
decades and now are the largest segment of the U.S. economy. Despite
a dearth of detailed evidence, there are strong indications that this
shift has already been taking place in other advanced economies as
well.1 Even some emerging market economies are likely to experience
a similar long-run structural shift in the near future.
It should be noted that since we have documented this trend in the
U.S. until the late 1990s in our earlier work [4], we will first focus on
the quantitative measures of these changes for the most recent years
and discuss them in the context of the long-term trends.
3.1 Data and Methodology
The main sources of data for measuring the size and structure of
the U.S. information economy in this article are: (1) 2002 Benchmark
1Using the same methodology as Apte and Nath [8], Choi et al. [32] conclude that, while
having a relatively larger manufacturing sector than the U.S., Korea was effectively an
information economy by 2000.
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Input–Output (I–O) Accounts, for value-added data at the six-digit
level of industrial classification; (2) Annual Industry Accounts, for data
on value added by three-digit industries for 2002 and 2007; (3) Fixed
Assets in the National Economic Accounts for data on depreciation of
private nonresidential fixed assets — all compiled and maintained by
the BEA; and (4) Occupational Employment Statistics (OES), com-
piled and maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) [28].
Most data are available online at the BEA and BLS websites [27, 29].2
In order to measure the size and structure of the material and infor-
mation domain of the U.S. economy, we closely followed the framework
and methodology developed by Porat [73].3 Under his scheme, the U.S.
economy is divided into two distinct but inseparable domains: one is
“involved in the transformation of matter and energy from one form
into another” and the other is involved “in transforming information
from one pattern into another,” where information is defined as the
“data that have been organized and communicated.” The term “mate-
rial” refers to the first domain and “information” refers to the second
domain. An operational definition of “information” encompasses “all
workers, machinery, goods, and services that are employed in process-
ing, manipulating, and transmitting information.”4
The information sector is further subdivided into: (1) the PRIS,
which produces information goods and services; and (2) the SIS, which
represents the part of the value created by information workers, infor-
mation capital, and information activity of the proprietor in the pro-
cess of production of a “material” good or a “material” service. The
total value added of an industry belonging to the PRIS is counted as
a part of the information domain of the economy. For example, the
total value added generated by the semiconductor industry (semicon-
ductor is an information product) and the telecommunication industry
(telecommunication is an information service) is a part of the infor-
mation economy value added. In case of an industry belonging to the
SIS, only a part of the value added is counted toward the information
2See the Technical Appendix [3, 5] for a detailed discussion of the data and data sources.
3Depending on the availability of data and the changes in definitions, we made certain
modifications. See the Technical Appendix.
4Porat [73, vol. 1, p. 2].
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economy. Thus, information value added of an SIS industry includes
(1) employee compensation of information workers, (2) a part of pro-
prietors’ income and corporate profits earned for performing informa-
tional tasks, and (3) capital consumption allowances (depreciation) on
information machines. For example, for the textile industry (textile is
a material product) or the transportation industry (transportation is a
material service), only the value-added contributions of the information
workers (e.g., managers, accountants), the information capital (e.g.,
computers) employed in those industries — measured by wages and
capital consumption allowances of information capital goods, respec-
tively — plus a part of the proprietors’ income and corporate prof-
its, are counted as a part of the information economy. Thus, for these
two industries, the total value added is decomposed into a material
component and an information component.
Using the detailed Benchmark I–O tables compiled and published
by the BEA, the industries at the six-digit level of industrial classifica-
tion belonging to the PRIS were identified, and their value-added fig-
ures were aggregated at the three-digit level of aggregation that roughly
matched the level of disaggregation at which SIS value-added data were
obtained. For the SIS, the OES data compiled by the BLS were used
to construct matrices of employment and wages by occupations and
industries. The occupational employment data for industries belonging
to the PRIS were excluded.5 For the remainder, the occupations were
classified as belonging either to information or noninformation cate-
gories according to the scheme described in Porat [73]. The information
workers were broadly defined as those who were primarily engaged in
the production, processing, or distribution of information.
The data on depreciation of information capital assets were obtained
from the Fixed Assets dataset of the BEA. The list of information cap-
ital assets was slightly different from Porat’s.6 It included computer
and peripheral equipment, software, communications equipment, pho-
tocopy and related equipment, and office buildings, communication,
5Some three-digit industries belong entirely to the PRIS while, for others, only a part
belongs to it. See the Technical Appendix [3, 5].
6Note that some of the information-capital assets either did not exist or were not previously
considered as capital assets.
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religious, and educational structures. We further used data on net
operating surplus from Annual Industry Accounts to add a portion of
the proprietors’ income accrued for performing information activities.
Although the proportion of time allocated by proprietors toward infor-
mation activities may have changed over the years due to the changing
nature of economic activities, in the absence of relevant information,
we used the same time allocation ratios as Porat’s. The online techni-
cal appendix to this monograph provides a detailed description of how
these data were incorporated in the calculation of SIS value added.
By combining this material–information dichotomy with the
product–service dichotomy, we gained useful insights into the
structural changes that had taken place in the U.S. economy. At
the aggregate level, this exercise decomposed the economy into four
supersectors, as shown in Figure 1.1. This study used a product–service
classification scheme that was slightly different from the conventional
“goods-services” classification used in economics, but was the same
as the one used by Apte et al. [4]. Note that because of the switch
from the old product-based SIC system to the new process-based
NAICS in 1997, there have been some changes even in the conventional
product–service classification used in economic data (see Lawson
et al., [58]). The classification scheme used in this research reflected
some of the important changes that had taken place in production and
consumption due to technological changes. Nevertheless, the difference
in terms of aggregate value added was expected to be minimal because
most industries belonging to the product and services category under
these two classifications were the same.
The proposed classification scheme is based on three distinct
criteria.
(1) Market transaction or delivery mode: Products are in stan-
dard units, not differentiated by customer, priced by unit,
and preproduced while services are processed, produced, and
customized on demand, and priced by process rather than by
unit.
(2) Form: Products are tangible, while services are intangible or
experiential.
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(3) Production process: Products are produced entirely by sup-
pliers, while services are often co-produced with the customer
present.
After the industries were classified into the product and services
category, the material and information value-added data were aggre-
gated separately to construct a 2× 2 matrix similar to Figure 1.1 for
each year. Two different versions of this matrix were created to display
(1) actual value in current prices and (2) percentage distribution of
shares in total GNP.
Ideally, we wanted to compute value added at constant dollars for
these four supersectors of the U.S. economy so that we could consider
their growth over the years. However, there were some formidable con-
straints to be faced. Since 1996, the BEA began using an “ideal chain
index” to construct real value-added series. This step purported to elim-
inate some of the problematic issues associated with the fixed-weight
index that was in common use until then. Although this new method
of constructing real series in chained dollars improved the quality of
the data, it introduced certain other limitations. One of them was the
nonadditivity of disaggregate series: Unlike with fixed-weight series,
the chained dollar series could not simply be added to construct aggre-
gate series.7 Furthermore, there could be significant differences in price
changes between the material and information components of value
added and, as such, one would use different deflators for these two
components. Unfortunately, separate price indices were not available
and it was not straightforward to construct such indices from available
data.
Note that the detailed benchmark I–O tables were available at
5-year intervals, and the most recent tables that were publicly avail-
able were for 2002. The detailed benchmark I–O tables for 2007 were
not available yet. However, value-added data were available at roughly
the three-digit level of industrial classification for 2007. In the absence
of detailed (more disaggregated) industry-level data, we applied PRIS
value-added ratios at the three-digit level of industries for 2002 to the
7For a detailed discussion, see Landefeld and Parker [57] and Whelan [82].
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2007 value-added data to arrive at some approximate measures of the
PRIS in 2007. Since most of the relevant data for SIS were available,
the SIS measures for 2007 were consistent with 2002 and the earlier
years.
3.2 Main Findings
3.2.1 Size and Structure of the U.S. Information
Economy from 1967 to 2007
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the value-added contributions — both in
current dollar value and percentages — of primary and secondary infor-
mation sectors to the U.S. GNP in 2002 and 2007, respectively.8 As we
Table 3.1. Size and structure of the U.S. information economy, 2002.
Value-added Percentage share
(billions of current USD) in GNP (%)
Description 1 2
Primary information sector (PRIS) 4,132.5 38.65
Secondary information sector (SIS) 2,481.2 23.21
Total information 6,613.6 61.86
Total material 4,077.8 38.14
Gross national product (GNP) 10,691.4 100.00
Note: See Technical Appendix [3] for detailed calculations.
Table 3.2. Size and structure of the U.S. information economy, 2007.
Value-added Percentage share
(billions of current USD) in GNP (%)
Description 1 2
Primary information sector (PRIS) 5,534.6 38.99
Secondary information sector (SIS) 3,014.0 21.24
Total information 8,548.5 60.23
Total material 5,644.9 39.77
Gross national product (GNP) 14,193.3 100.00
Note: See Technical Appendix [3] for detailed calculations.
8Since the beginning of the 1990s, GDP, instead of GNP, is used as a measure of national
income in the U.S. Whereas GDP measures all income generated in the U.S., GNP mea-
sures all income earned by U.S. nationals. Numerically, the difference between GDP and
GNP in the U.S. has been insignificant. We use GNP to make our calculations comparable
with those of Porat [73].
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Table 3.3. Size and structure of the U.S. information economy, 1967–2002.
1967 1992 1997 2002 2007
Description 1 2 3 4 5
Primary information sector (PRIS) 25.1 33.0 35.2 38.7 39.0
Secondary information sector (SIS) 21.1 22.9 27.8 23.2 21.2
Total information 46.3 55.9 63.0 61.9 60.2
Total material 53.7 44.1 37.0 38.1 39.8
Gross national product (GNP) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: This table is compiled from various sources: Porat [73] for 1967; Apte
and Nath [8] for 1992 and 1997; and Technical Appendix [3].
can see from column 1 of Table 3.1, about 6.6 trillion USD or about
62% of the total GNP in 2002 was generated in the information sector.
The PRIS accounted for about 39% of the GNP and the SIS accounted
for about 23%. Less than two-fifths of the GNP was generated in the
material sector of the U.S. economy. In contrast, the value-added contri-
butions of the information sector in 2007, which was of the magnitude
of 8.5 trillion USD, accounted for about 60% of the GNP. While the
PRIS share in GNP went up slightly from 38.65% to 38.99%, there was
a drop in the GNP share of SIS between 2002 and 2007.
In Table 3.3, we present percentage share contributions of PRIS,
SIS, total information, and material sectors to the GNP for different
years. In addition to our calculations for 2002 and 2007, we included
those of Porat [73] and Apte and Nath [8].9 We observed steady growth
(in terms of percentage share in GNP) of the PRIS between 1967 and
2007. The SIS experienced a significantly large increase between 1992
and 1997 and a steady decline thereafter. Considering the fact that
the 1990s were a period of unprecedented advances in ICT, it is not
surprising that the PRIS, the SIS, and the total information share
increased significantly between 1992 and 1997. The remarkable growth
9 Ideally, we would like to include the results of the OECD [69] study that included the
U.S. information economy measures for 1958, 1967, and 1972 (1974). Although the OECD
study followed Porat’s methodology, it makes a few modifications to make the measure-
ments comparable across 10 OECD member countries. First, instead of using GNP, it uses
GDP. Second, it uses value added at factor cost to avoid potential distortions caused by
differential tax rates across the countries. Because of these modifications, the numbers
presented in the OECD study are not quite comparable with the ones reported by other
studies and cited in this monograph.
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of the SIS seemed to be partly a reflection of the fact that industries
not producing information goods and services (non-PRIS sector) were
investing in information capital and hiring information workers at a
significantly higher rate in the process of adopting the new ICT.10
Furthermore, as Apte and Nath [8] discussed, the SIS measures for
1997 were based on employment and wage data for 1998 with reasonable
adjustments back to the previous year. This may have introduced an
upward bias in measuring the SIS. However, it is unlikely that this
upward bias explained the entire growth in percentage share of the SIS
in GNP between 1992 and 1997.
In contrast, there are several factors that may have contributed to
the decline of the SIS, and therefore the size of the information econ-
omy, in terms of their share in GNP since 1997. First, the IT bust and
the recession of the early 2000s may have had an impact on the decline
of the SIS. Second, as new IC technologies took hold, a series of com-
plementary innovations such as restructuring and reorganization (of
which outsourcing — both onshore and offshore – is a part) took place.
These innovations led to greater specialization, particularly of informa-
tion activities. It is not hard to see that one of the consequences would
be an enlargement of the PRIS. Although it needs further investigation,
the increase in the share of the PRIS was an indication that it may have
been the case. Note that the growth of PRIS between 2002 and 2007
seemed to have been insignificant. Offshore outsourcing of information
services could have been one of the reasons for the slowdown.11 Third,
decreases in the relative prices of information goods and services also
explained the slowing down of the growth of the PRIS share and the
decline in the share of the SIS and of the overall information economy.12
10Tevlin and Whelan [80] discuss the special behavior of investment in computers that
contributed to the investment boom of the 1990s. Further, Wolff [84] finds that there were
significant increases in the employment of information workers over the years and argues
that this increase is attributed to changes in production technology, Nevertheless, these
studies provide only indirect support to this conjecture and it needs further investigation.
11Bardhan and Kroll [15] give an account of a new wave of offshore outsourcing in the early
2000s.
12There is a literature that investigates productivity growth and falling prices of ICT goods
and services. See, for example, Gordon [41].
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The fourth factor that may have contributed to the decline in the
size of the information economy since 1997 was the increasing amount of
“shadow work,” the unpaid work done in a wage-based economy, being
performed by the customers. The growth of information technology,
coupled with the increasing use of the “self service” strategy by many
businesses, led to a situation in which the customers were increasingly
engaging in shadow work. For example, consider the airline industry.
Airports have self-service check-in kiosks that allow travelers to perform
the job previously performed by airline counter personnel. Similarly,
not too long ago, travel agents helped travelers purchase airline tickets
with suitable fare and itinerary. Today, the same travelers spend their
own time searching the Internet for flights and fares to create their own
itinerary and purchase their tickets online. To the extent that travelers
were not compensated for the shadow work they performed, this work
and its associated value was not captured in the formal economy. Hence,
even if the real share of information economy in GNP were on the rise,
its share in the formal economy could decline, as seen in the data in
Table 3.3.
3.2.2 Decomposition of the U.S. GNP
Table 3.4 presents 2× 2 decompositions of the U.S. GNP for 1967,
1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007. The decompositions for the first 3 years
were taken from Apte et al. [4]. For both 2002 and 2007, information
services were the largest segment of the economy, with more than half
of total value added generated in that supersector. In contrast, infor-
mation products were the smallest sector with slightly more than 5%
value-added contributions to the U.S. economy in both 2002 and 2007.
When we compared the percentage shares of these four supersectors in
2002 and 2007 with those in previous years, we made two important
observations. First, the shares of information products and information
services continuously declined from 1997 through 2007. Second, while
the GNP share of material products declined continuously until 2002,
there was a slight increase between 2002 and 2007. In contrast, the
share of material services declined until 1997, and then rose steadily.
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Table 3.4. 2 × 2 decomposition of the U.S. GNP, 1967–2007.
Percentage shares in GNP Value in millions of current US dollar
1967 1967
Products Services Total
Material 19.2 34.5 53.72
Information 10.5 35.8 46.28
Total 29.66 70.34 100.00
Products Services Total
Material 152514 274775 427289
Information 83370 284730 368100
Total 235884 559505 795389
1992 1992
Products Services Total
Material 12.7 31.5 44.13
Information 6.5 49.4 55.87
Total 19.11 80.89 100.00
Products Services Total
Material 788844 1961990 2750834
Information 402520 3080551 3483071
Total 1191364 5042541 6233905
1997 1997
Products Services Total
Material 10.5 26.5 37.00
Information 6.9 56.1 63.00
Total 17.40 82.60 100.00
Products Services Total
Material 877051 2211055 3088106
Information 577631 4679908 5257539
Total 1454682 6890963 8345645
2002 2002
Products Services Total
Material 9.5 28.7 38.1
Information 5.9 56.0 61.9
Total 15.3 84.7 100.00
Products Services Total
Material 1012160 3065612 4077772
Information 626982 5986665 6613647
Total 1639142 9052277 10691419
2007 2007
Products Services Total
Material 10.2 29.6 39.8
Information 5.3 54.9 60.2
Total 15.5 84.5 100.00
Products Services Total
Material 1450469 4194413 5644882
Information 750487 7798062 8548548
Total 2200956 11992474 14193430
Note: See Technical Appendix [3] for detailed calculations.
3.3 Information–Material Decomposition
at the Industry Level
Table 3.5 presents some relevant facts about the size and structure of
the information economy at the industry level for the 25 largest private
industries (according to their respective shares in GNP in 2002) and the
government for 2002 and 2007. Note that these 25 industries accounted
for about 71% of the GNP in 2002. The GNP shares are shown in
columns 1 and 3. Columns 2 and 4 present the shares of information
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value added for each industry. As we can see from this table, four ser-
vice industries, namely real estate, retail trade, wholesale trade, and
construction, accounted for about 30% of the GNP in both years.
None of these four industries produce information goods or services.
However, information activities contributed more than one half of total
value added only in trade. Included in this list of the 25 largest indus-
tries are two financial service industries — “Federal Reserves, banks,
credit intermediation, and related activities” and “Insurance carriers
and related activities” — and “Broadcasting and telecommunications”
with GNP shares greater than 2% that belong to the PRIS. There are
four other PRIS industries and three more with an information share
larger than 90% that have made it to this list of the top 25 industries.
Columns 5 and 6 present growth rates of value added in 2005 chained
dollars for two 5-year periods: 1997–2002 and 2002–2007, respectively.
These rates represent the growth of quantity or volume. Note that dur-
ing these two periods, the U.S. economy grew by about 17% and 14%,
respectively. Among these 25 industries, 11 grew faster than the overall
economy in both periods. Six of them were highly information-intensive
industries such as “Broadcasting and telecommunications,” “Computer
and electronic products,” “Publishing industries,” and “Computer sys-
tems design and related industries,” Besides these, there were two other
information-intensive industries that grew faster than the economy in
one of the two periods. We present percentage changes in prices for
various industries during 1997–2002 and 2002–2007, in columns 7 and
8, respectively. They give another perspective on the changes that took
place during this 10-year period. Note that the industries experiencing
negative price changes were mostly information-intensive industries.
These decreases in prices may partially explain the decline in the share
of the information economy, as shown in Table 3.3.
The governments at all levels, local, state, and federal, accounted for
about 12% of GNP. Within the government, information activities con-
tributed about 74% in 2002 and declined to 70% in 2007. Government
grew slower than the economy during this period.
4
Employment and Wages in the U.S. Economy
In this section, we present and analyze the changes in the U.S. labor
market that have taken place, along with the structural shifts that we
have discussed above. Due to a lack of data, our empirical analysis was
limited to a relatively shorter sample period that began in 1999. How-
ever, the major findings in this section are consistent with our analysis
of the long-run structural shifts and contribute to the understanding
of various implications for the labor market in the U.S.
4.1 Data and Methodology
The main source of data for the analysis of the labor market was the
OES, compiled and published by the BLS. The data included, among
other things, the number of workers and the average annual wages
for more than 800 occupations, and by industries at various levels of
industrial classification since 1999. The data were available for two- and
three-digit-level SIC industries between 1999 and 2001, and for two-,
three-, four-, and five-digit-level NAICS industries since 2002.
We classified occupations into information and noninformation
categories. This classification scheme was different from the one used
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in Porat [73] and Apte and Nath [8], and also from those used by some
other previous studies (for example, [11, 12, 84]). This scheme — based
on the framework developed by Apte and Mason [6] and used by Apte
et al. [4] — recognized that every occupation used information at vari-
ous intensities. Following Apte and Mason, the information intensity of
an occupation was defined as the fraction of time spent in dealing with
information-intensive tasks (i.e., in creating, processing, and communi-
cating information). Occupations were classified according to five levels
of information intensity. If an occupation required creating, processing,
and communicating information and did not require physical presence
in a specific location or physical action by the worker, then it was clas-
sified as an information occupation. An occupation that required only
physical action and did not involve creation, processing, and communi-
cation of information was called a noninformation occupation. Because
many occupations involved creation, processing, and communication of
information as well as physical action (including physical presence in a
particular location), they were classified into one of the three intermedi-
ate categories based on the fraction of time spent on information actions
versus noninformation actions: high (75% information and 25% nonin-
formation), medium (50% information and 50% noninformation), and
low (25% information and 75% noninformation). However, there were
no clear guidelines for assessing the information intensity of various
occupations. The detailed descriptions of occupations from the Dictio-
nary of Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) Codes, available
from the BLS, were used to determine information intensity. Then, by
applying the weights: 100%, 75%, 50%, 25%, and 0% total employ-
ment was decomposed into the two broad categories: information and
noninformation for each disaggregate industry.
The following equation is used for the decomposition of total









where IE i and NE i are, respectively, the full-time equivalent (FTE)
information and noninformation employment in industry i; vj is the





Information Workers in 
Product Sectors 
Information Workers in 
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Fig. 4.1 A 2 × 2 decomposition of the U.S. labor market based on information intensity at
the level of occupational data.
information-intensity weight applied to the jth occupation and vj ∈
[0,0.25,0.50,0.75,1]; and Eji is the number of workers employed in
occupation j in industry i.
A similar equation is used to calculate wage bills for information








where Wji is the annual average wage for occupation j in industry
i. The product–service classification is then applied to the industries,
and the information and noninformation employments are aggregated
for each of these two broad categories. The total wage bills are also cal-
culated for information and noninformation workers in each industry.
Then, the industries are classified into the product or service cate-
gory, and the aggregate wage bills are obtained by these two broad
categories.
The resulting data on employment and the total wage bill were
decomposed into four major categories, as shown in Figure 4.1, for the
years from 1999 to 2007. This decomposition gave another perspective
on the structural changes that had taken place in the U.S. economy
focusing on the labor market. Note that this decomposition is related
to but not quite the same as that in Figure 1.1.
4.2 Main Findings
Table 4.1 presents the 2× 2 decomposition of total employment, wage
bill, and average wages in the U.S. economy for each year between 1999


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2 Main Findings 33
and 2007. For each year, employment and wage bill are distributed in
terms of percentage shares among the four categories of workers indi-
cated by a combination of the descriptions along the relevant rows and
columns. For example, in 1999, noninformation workers in the products
sector accounted for 10% of the total employment and only 8.63% of
total wage bill in the U.S. economy. The table also presents the total
for the categories under each dimension of the double dichotomy. Thus,
workers in the products sector accounted for 14% of total employment
and approximately 15% of total wage bill in 1999, while workers in the
services sector accounted for the remaining 86% and 85% of employ-
ment and wages, respectively. In contrast, noninformation workers con-
stituted about 55% of total employment and about 46% of total wage
bill in that year. Correspondingly, information workers accounted for
about 45% and 54% of employment and wages, respectively. The figures
under the “average wage” column represent average wages (in current
dollars) of the four categories of workers. For example, a noninforma-
tion worker in the products sector earned an average income of USD
27,061 in 1999. The table also presents average wages by broad cate-
gories. Thus, a worker in the products sector, on average, earned USD
33,264, while he/she earned USD 31,070 in the services sector in 1999.
In contrast, a noninformation worker, on average, earned USD 26,224,
while an information worker earned USD 37,713 per year in the same
year.
We made the following observations from this table. First, a
majority of all workers were employed in the services sector. The
share of services employment had increased from 86% in 1999 to
approximately 90% in 2007. Within services, although noninformation
workers were the largest constituent, with about 45% of total employ-
ment in 1999, the employment share of information workers rose from
about 41% in 1999 to about 44% in 2000 and then to about 45% in
2007, becoming the largest category of workers in the economy. In the
products sector, the employment shares of both information and non-
information workers have been steadily falling. Along the information–
noninformation dichotomy, the noninformation workers accounted for
about 55% of total employment in 1999, and this share dropped to
about 52% in 2007.
34 Employment and Wages in the U.S. Economy
Second, services workers received the largest share of the total wage
bill in the U.S., and this share increased from about 85% in 1999 to
about 89% in 2007. Within services, information workers received the
largest share, accounting for about 48% of total wage bill in 1999. This
share rose steadily to 52.5% in 2007. The wage bill share of the prod-
ucts workers steadily declined, with slight fluctuations for information
and noninformation workers over that period. Furthermore, the overall
share of information workers in the total wage bill increased from about
54% in 1999 to 57% in 2007.
Third, the average wages were higher in the products sector. Within
this sector, information workers, on average, earned about 1.8 times
higher than the noninformation workers. In the services sector, infor-
mation workers earned about 1.4 times higher than the noninformation
workers. Overall, the average wage of information workers was one and
one half times greater than that of noninformation workers. However,
there are sectoral differences in the earnings of information workers.
On average, they earned about 1.3 times higher in the products sector
than their counterparts in the services sector. This, however, appeared
to be a reflection of the fact that most information workers in the prod-
ucts sector were engaged in “high-end” information jobs, while a large
number of information workers in the service sector were engaged in
“low-end” information jobs.1 We also found that noninformation work-
ers generally earned more in products industries than their counterparts
in services, although the difference was not large.
Another way of looking at growth of employment and wages during
this period is by plotting graphs. Figure 4.2 depicts the employment
growth of information and noninformation workers in the products and
services sector. As we can see from the figure, employment of both
types of workers in the products sector fell steadily through this period.
There was a sharp decline in 2002, immediately after the recession of
2001. The services sector employment exhibited a different pattern. The
1By “high-end” information jobs, we refer to those jobs that require high cognitive skills
and innovative ideas, such as managerial jobs, scientists, and designers; and by “low-end”
information jobs, we refer to those jobs that are routine or repetitive in nature and do not
require very high cognitive skills or innovative ideas, such as travel agent and customer
service representative.









1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Information workers
Non-information workers




















Fig. 4.2 Employment growth in the U.S.: 1999–2007.
Note: Differences in logarithmic values between successive period (×100) approximate per-
centage change.
employment of noninformation workers declined sharply between 1999
and 2000, while that of information workers rose significantly during
the same period. Between 2000 and 2001, employment of both types of
workers declined slightly, only to rise steadily thereafter. The growth
of services employment accelerated after 2004.
Figure 4.3 depicts the growth of average real wages for both informa-
tion and noninformation workers in the products and services sector.2
The average real wage of information workers in the products sector
rose steadily until 2002, remained almost constant until 2004, and fell
for two consecutive years. Between 2006 and 2007, it grew again. The
average real wage of noninformation workers, however, increased until
2002, and then steadily declined. The average real wage of informa-
tion workers in the services sector rose sharply between 2001 and 2002,
declined slightly until 2005, and then started rising. The average real
wage of noninformation workers in services also exhibited a similar pat-
tern of growth over this period of time.
2Real wage is obtained by adjusting nominal (current dollar) wage for inflation calculated
from the annual U.S. city average of all urban consumer price indices (CPI) published by
the BLS.
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Fig. 4.3 Growth of average wages in the U.S. economy: 1999–2007.
Note: Differences in logarithmic values between successive period (×100) approximate per-
centage change.
4.3 Sector-wise Employment and Wage Patterns
Table 4.2 presents a list of 25 industries, ranked in descending order
according to their shares in total employment between 2002 and 2007,
along with their respective shares of information workers, and aver-
age annual growth rates of employment and wages. The 25 industries
together accounted for about three-quarters of the total employment in
the U.S. economy during the sample period. The figures that appeared
in this table are annual averages over 2002–2007.3
As seen in column 2 of Table 4.2, for 13 of the 25 industries, infor-
mation workers accounted for more than half of their employment.
Column 3 indicates that 21 of these industries experienced growth in
total employment. Although the employment of information workers
increased for 21 industries (not necessarily the ones for which overall
employment increased), it increased faster than that of noninformation
3The selection of the sample period 2002–2007 for the analysis at the sectoral level is
dictated by two considerations. First, the data for 1999 through 2001 are available by
SIC industry codes while, for 2002 through 2007, they are available by the new NAICS
codes, which are not quite comparable at the disaggregate industry level. Second, the years
between 2002 and 2007 represent a period of business cycle expansion between two recent
recessions in the U.S.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3 Sector-wise Employment and Wage Patterns 39
workers only for 12 industries, which mostly included those indus-
tries with relatively larger shares of information workers. Prominent
among them are: “Educational Services” and “Professional, Scientific,
and Technical Services.” Interestingly, the employment of information
workers in the government sector fell faster than that of their nonin-
formation counterparts.
We also present the average annual growth rates of real wages for all
workers and information workers between 2002 and 2007. Columns 5
and 6 indicate that real wages for all workers fell for 11 of 25 industries
and real wages for information workers fell for 15 of 25 industries. For
only eight industries, including governments, did real wages rise for all
workers, as well as for information workers. Because both employment
and wages increased for seven private sector industries, demand fac-
tors were more dominant than supply factors for the workers in those
industries. These were all service industries that included “Educational
Services,” “Administrative and Support Services,” and “Hospitals,”
with significant total employment shares. Of note is that, while average
real wage for all workers in “Professional, Scientific, and Technical




This section briefly discusses some of the important recent trends in
international trade in the U.S.1 In particular, as more than 80% of
income and about 90% of employment are generated in services in the
U.S., trade in services is of special interest. It is important to note
that, although the U.S. has an overall trade deficit, it has had a sur-
plus in services trade and, as seen below, that surplus has grown in
recent years. As shown in Sections 3 and 4, because we observed a clear
shift of the economy and the labor market toward information-intensive
services, we will focus on information-intensive services in international
trade.
5.1 Data and Definitions
The main source of data for this section was the International Eco-
nomic Accounts of the BEA. The data are publicly available from the
BEA website (http://www.bea.gov/) [27]. We primarily used annual
data from between 1992 and 2009 for two reasons. First, the data with
1For a more detailed discussion with a special focus on the U.S. trade in information-
intensive services, see Apte and Nath [9].
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important details were consistently available for this period. Second,
this sample period coincided with the most recent period covered in
our analysis of the size and structure of the U.S. information economy.
As a note of caution, there are unresolved issues related to the
concepts and definitions used in the measurement of services trade. In
general, it had been recognized that “International trade and invest-
ment in services are an increasingly important part of global commerce.
Advances in information and telecommunication technologies have
expanded the scope of services that can be traded cross-border. . . trade
and foreign direct investment (FDI) in services have grown faster than
in goods over the past decade and a half.”2 This recognition led the
World Trade Organization (WTO) to include services in the multi-
lateral trade architecture in the form of the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS). Since, unlike merchandise trade, services
trade needs to encompass a wide range of international transactions;
the GATS takes a broad view of trade in services. Thus, the defini-
tion of trade in services that GATS uses includes four categories of
transactions: cross-border trade (services supplied across borders), con-
sumption abroad (services supplied in a country to foreigners), com-
mercial presence (services supplied in a country by foreign business
establishments), and the presence of natural persons (services supplied
in a country by foreign nationals). Recently, the statistical agencies in
the U.S. and other countries have tried to collect and compile data
on services trade according to this definitional framework set forth
by GATS.3
5.2 Main Observations
In Table 5.1, we present an overall account of U.S. trade in services
and goods relative to GDP in 1980 and 2010. While the dollar value of
merchandise trade (both exports and imports) increased about seven
times from less than half a trillion USD to more than 3 trillion USD, the
dollar value of services trade increased almost 10 times from barely 100
billion USD to about 1 trillion USD during this period. In 2010, services
2Mattoo et al. [65, p. 3]
3For a discussion on the efforts made by the BEA, see Koncz-Bruner and Flatness [56].
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Trade in services 100 3.6% 965 6.6% 8.0%
Trade in goods 474 17.0% 3,227 22.0% 7.0%
GDP 2,788 100.0% 14,660 100.0% 5.7%
Note: Services include both private and government services. Growth rates represent growth
in nominal value.
Source: Based on data from Table 1.1.5 of BEA’s National Economic Accounts.
Fig. 5.1 U.S. trade balances (exports–imports) in goods and services: 1980–2010.
Note: Trade balances for goods and services are calculated using data from Table 1.1.5 of
BEA’s National Economic Accounts. Services include both private and government services.
trade accounted for about 7% of U.S. GDP, while merchandise trade
accounted for about 22%. Thus, U.S. goods trade was more than three
times larger than services trade in 2010. The last column of Table 5.1
indicates that the value of both goods and services trade has been
growing faster than nominal GDP. Further, services trade has been
growing faster than merchandise trade.
Figure 5.1 plots the annual dollar value of trade balances (exports
minus imports) for both goods and services in the U.S. between 1980
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and 2010. The following observations were made. First, while the U.S.
has been a net importer of goods, it had been a net exporter of services
throughout the sample period. In 2010, the U.S. ran a deficit of about
USD 700 billion in merchandise trade. In contrast, it had a surplus of
more than USD 150 billion in services trade. Second, as merchandise
trade deficit grew significantly over the years, so did services trade
surplus. There was a steady rapid increase in services trade surplus
between 1985 and 1997 and then a steady decline between 1997 and
2003 before the surplus started rapidly rising again. In contrast, deficit
in merchandise trade steadily increased between 1991 and 2006, except
for a slight decline between 2000 and 2001. By 2005, merchandise trade
deficit surpassed USD 800 billion and stayed there for the next 3 years
before it fell drastically to about USD 500 billion in 2009. Although the
deficit in goods trade increased in 2010, it did not reach the 2005–2008
level. Third, while merchandise trade balance seemed to have been
sensitive to business cycle fluctuations, balance in services trade did
not seem to have been sensitive to such fluctuations. For example, the
steady increase in services trade surplus between 1985 and 1997 was
not affected by the recession of the early 1990s. Similarly, the decline in
services trade surplus during the 2001 recessionary cycle seemed to be
more of a part of the downward trend between 1997 and 2003, rather
than an effect of the economic slowdown of 2001. Furthermore, the drop
in 2009 was moderate.
We further examine the patterns in services trade by looking at its
share in total trade. Figure 5.2 presents the share of services in total
trade and also the export and import shares of services separately.
Trade in services accounted for about 17% of all trade in 1980. This
share increased to about 24% in 1992 and then steadily decreased to
about 20% in 2000, after which it increased slightly during 2000–2008,
and significantly to about 25% in 2009. In 2010, trade share of services
dropped to about 23%. The export and import shares of services
followed similar patterns, although export shares had been much larger
than import shares. The export share of services fluctuated between
a minimum of 19.6% (in 1980) and a maximum of 32.7% (in 2009),
while the import share fluctuated between 15.4% (in 1980) and 19.7%
(in 1991).
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Fig. 5.2 Trade shares of services trade, services exports, and services imports: 1980–2010.
Note: Shares of services trade, exports, and imports are calculated using data from
Table 1.1.5 of BEA’s National Economic Accounts. Services include both private and gov-
ernment services.
Further, it is interesting to observe that the role of multinational
companies (MNCs) in services trade has become increasingly impor-
tant. For example, the intra-industry or affiliated trade between MNCs
and their affiliates accounted for 17% of total services trade in 1992, and
this contribution rose to more than 27% in 2009. Figure 5.3 presents the
share of affiliated trade in total services trade, and in services exports
and imports separately. Exports of services by the U.S. MNCs to their
foreign affiliates and by the affiliates of foreign MNCs located in the
U.S. to their parent companies in other countries increased from about
20% in 1992 to more than 28% in 2009. Similarly, imports from foreign
MNCs or affiliates of U.S. MNCs located outside the U.S. increased
from about 13% to about 26% during the same period. The increase
in affiliated services trade also indicated an increase in foreign direct
investment (FDI) in services by the U.S. MNCs abroad as well as by
foreign MNCs in the U.S.
We present the export and import shares of five major cate-
gories of private services during 1992–2009 in Figure 5.4(a) and (b),
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Fig. 5.3 Affiliated trade shares in total trade, exports, and imports of private services in
the U.S.
Note: Shares of affiliated trade, exports, and imports are calculated using data from Table 1
(Trade in Services), Detailed Statistics for Cross-Border Trade under U.S. International
Services, BEA.
respectively.4 These categories include travel, passenger fares, other
transportation, royalties and license fees, and other private services.
Note that the BEA provides services trade data by seven major cat-
egories that include, in addition to the five categories above, transfer
under U.S. military sales contracts and U.S. government miscellaneous
services. These figures clearly indicate that “other private services”
experienced the highest growth in both export share and import share.
The export share of “other private services” (in total exports of pri-
vate services) increased from about 31% in 1992 to about 49% in 2009,
while the import share increased from about 25% to about 50% during
the same time period. In contrast, travel services, which used to be the
largest category with more than 30% of both exports and imports of
services in 1992, declined in terms of its shares and accounted for only
4The data on services trade have been highly aggregated. Disaggregated data by detailed
categories of services are available only for recent years.
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Fig. 5.4 (a) Shares of five major categories of services in total services exports from the
U.S. (b) Shares of five major categories of services in total services imports into the U.S.
Note: Export and import shares of major categories of services are calculated using data
from Table 1 (Trade in Services), Detailed Statistics for Cross-Border Trade under U.S.
International Services, BEA.
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about 20% in 2009. Note that “passenger fares” and “other transporta-
tion” are two subcategories within travel services, and both declined in
their shares in total exports and imports of private services. A decline
in the cost of travel may partially explain the decrease in these shares.
The remaining major category of private services, namely “royalties
and license fees,” experienced growth during this period. For example,
its export share increased from about 13% in 1992 to about 19% in
2009. The import share also increased from about 5% to about 8%
during this period.
This discussion clearly shows that trade in two major categories of
services, “other private services” and “royalties and license fees,” is the
largest and fastest growing segment of services trade in the U.S. As we
will see in the next subsection, the services included within these two
broad categories were primarily information-intensive services.
5.2.1 Trade in Information-Intensive Services
We will now focus entirely on the analysis of the U.S. trade in
information-intensive services. We may categorize “royalties and license
fees” as an information-intensive service.5 This service category
includes the following detailed subcategories: industrial processes;
books, records, and tapes; broadcasts and recordings of live events;
franchise fees; trademarks; general-use computer software; and other
intangibles. Thus, exports of “royalties and license fees” are essentially
the royalties and license fees received by the U.S. for the use of the
intangible items listed above in foreign countries. Similarly, imports
are such payments by the U.S. for the use of these intangible items
developed and produced in foreign countries.
Furthermore, the services included in the category “other private
services” are primarily information-intensive services.6 This cate-
gory is broadly divided into education; financial services; insurance;
telecommunications; business, professional, and technical services; and
5Co [35] refers to this category as knowledge-intensive services.
6Markusen [63] modeled this category as a capital-intensive service.
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a residual category called “others.” The category “business, profes-
sional, and technical services” is further subdivided into advertising;
computer and data processing; database and other information services;
research, development, and testing services; management, consulting,
and public relations services; legal services; construction, engineering,
architectural, and mining services; industrial engineering; installation,
maintenance, and repair of equipment; and other business, professional,
and technical services. Except for “construction, engineering, architec-
tural, and mining services” and “installation, maintenance, and repair
of equipment,” other categories are highly information intensive. These
two categories do not entirely involve creating, processing, and commu-
nicating information and require some physical activity.
As discussed above, the export and import shares of these two major
categories of information-intensive services: “royalties and license fees”
and “other private services,” increased significantly between 1992 and
2009. Together they accounted for about 68% of total private services
exports from the U.S. in 2009. Similarly, the combined import share of
“royalties and license fees” and “other private services” was about 58%
of total imports of private services in 2009.
We now discuss how trade in these two categories of information-
intensive services has changed by types of trade. Table 5.2 presents
a decomposition of trade by two types: affiliated (intra-industry) and
unaffiliated for these two broad categories in 1992 and 2009. In gen-
eral, we made the following observations. First, intra-industry trade
accounted for about two-thirds of exports as well as imports of “royal-
ties and license fees,” but only one-third of exports and about two-fifths
of imports of “other private services.” Second, within affiliated trade,
the exports from the U.S. parent companies to their foreign affiliates
were the largest component of intra-industry exports for both categories
of services. In case of intra-industry imports, while the imports by the
U.S. affiliates from their foreign parent companies were the largest com-
ponent for “royalties and license fees,” it was the imports by U.S. parent
companies from their foreign affiliates that were the largest for “other
private services.”
We now examine more disaggregated data; however, total trade
data for the detailed subcategories under “royalties and license fees”
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Table 5.2. Affiliated and unaffiliated trade in royalties and license fees and other private
services, 1992 and 2009 (values in millions of current USD).
Royalties and license fees Other private services
Description 1992 2009 1992 2009
Panel A: Exports
Total 20,841 89,791 52,854 238,332
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Affiliated 15,658 58,817 17,461 78,172
(75.1%) (65.5%) (33.0%) (32.8%)
By U.S. parent companies to 14,925 55,430 11,117 53,636
their foreign affiliates (71.6%) (61.7%) (21.0%) (22.5%)
By U.S. affiliates to their 733 3,387 6,347 24,536
foreign parent companies (3.5%) (3.8%) (12.0%) (10.3%)
Unaffiliated 5,183 30,974 35,388 160,159
(24.9%) (34.5%) (67%) (67.2%)
Panel B: Imports
Total 5,161 25,230 25,462 168,892
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Affiliated 3,396 18,350 9,640 66,978
(65.8%) (72.7%) (37.9%) (39.7%)
By U.S. parent companies from 189 4,508 5,355 46,687
their foreign affiliates (3.7%) (17.9%) (21.0%) (27.6%)
By U.S. affiliates from their 3,207 13,843 4,285 20,291
foreign parent companies (62.1%) (54.9%) (16.8%) (12.0%)
Unaffiliated 1,766 6,880 15,816 101,913
(34.2%) (27.3%) (62.1%) (60.3%)
Note: Percentage shares in total export and import values for the respective categories
are in bracket.
Source: Calculations based on data from Table 4 (Royalties and License Fees) and Table 5
(Other Private Services), Detailed Statistics for Cross-Border Trade under U.S. Interna-
tional Services, BEA.
are available only from 2006. Table 5.3 presents the percentage shares
of seven different subcategories in total export and import values of
“royalties and license fees” for 4 years between 2006 and 2009. Note
that data are available only for unaffiliated trade before 2006 and, there-
fore, they are not comparable with the figures since 2006. This table
shows that two major items, industrial processes and general-use com-
puter software, together accounted for about 80% of total exports of
“royalties and license fees” and more than 80% of total imports into
the U.S. While the share of “industrial processes” declined, that of
“general-use computer software” increased during this 4-year period.
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Table 5.3. Shares of various sub-categories in total exports and imports of royalties and
license fees, 2006–2009 (In percentages, unless and otherwise stated).
Exports Imports
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
Industrial processes 45.8 43.0 42.5 39.7 70.3 66.8 63.0 65.3
Books, records, and tapes 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.6 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.2
Broadcasting and
recording of live events
0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 4.3 0.8 3.9 0.9
Franchise fees 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.8 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.8
Trademarks 14.7 13.7 13.2 13.0 8.2 9.0 9.4 9.5
General-use computer
software
32.0 36.0 37.2 40.1 12.6 19.2 19.2 19.8
Other intangibles 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5




70,727 84,580 93,920 89,791 23,518 24,931 25,781 25,230
Source: Calculations based on data from Table 4 (Royalties and License Fees), Detailed
Statistics for Cross-Border Trade under U.S. International Services, BEA.
Overall, the total export value of this broad category was more than
three times higher than its import value.
In Figure 5.5(a) and (b), we present the shares of major subcate-
gories of services under “other private services” in total services exports
and imports, respectively. Note that for “financial services” and “busi-
ness, professional, and technical services,” data were available only
since 1997. Among the export categories, “business, professional, and
technical services” and “financial services” were the two largest subcat-
egories with about 24% and 12% of total private services exports from
the U.S., and their share rose from about 18% and 5%, respectively,
in 1997. While, during the recent financial crisis, the share of “finan-
cial services” dropped since its peak in 2007, the exports of “business,
professional, and technical services” continued to grow. Among the ser-
vices imports, the share of “business, professional, and technical ser-
vices” grew from less than 15% in 1997 to about 25%. The other service
that experienced significant growth in its share, particularly since 2000,
was insurance. In 2000, imports of insurance accounted for about 5%
of total private services imports into the U.S. It grew to about 15% in
2009. Bermuda was the largest exporter of insurance to the U.S.
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Fig. 5.5 (a) Shares of six subcategories of other private services in total exports of private
services from the U.S. (b) Shares of six subcategories of other private services in total
imports of private services into the U.S.
Note: Export and import shares of major categories of services are calculated using data
from Table 5 (Other Private Services), Detailed Statistics for Cross-Border Trade under
U.S. International Services, BEA.
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Table 5.4. Shares of various sub-categories in total exports and imports of business, pro-
fessional, technical services, 2006–2009 (in percentages, unless and otherwise stated).
Exports Imports
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
Advertising 4.37 3.94 3.57 3.40 3.07 3.07 2.67 2.85
Computer and data
processing services
6.64 6.94 7.34 7.35 20.82 20.34 19.11 19.83
Database and other
information services
5.03 4.58 4.25 4.12 0.95 1.12 1.24 1.12
Research and
development




24.80 26.18 25.25 24.17 30.09 27.65 27.08 27.14




6.30 5.78 6.17 5.82 2.26 2.15 2.30 2.19
Industrial engineering
services








11.40 12.39 13.70 12.80 14.53 12.37 12.80 12.26





86,390 103,765 115,229 116,629 61,698 70,413 82,537 81,995
Source: Calculations based on data from Table 7 (Business, Professional, and Technical
Services), Detailed Statistics for Cross-Border Trade under U.S. International Services,
BEA.
To shed further light on this topic, we will now examine a few
detailed subcategories within “business, professional, and technical ser-
vices.” Table 5.4 presents the percentage shares of 10 different subcate-
gories in total export and import values of “business, professional, and
technical services” for 4 years between 2006 and 2009. “Management
consulting and public relations services” was the largest subcategory,
accounting for about one-quarter of total exports and more than one-
quarter of total imports under the broad category. This was followed
by “research, development, and testing services,” with about 15% of
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exports and more than 15% of imports. The import share has also
increased over time.
Overall, dramatic increases in export and import shares of finan-
cial services and insurance seem to reflect greater global financial inte-
gration through the use of ICT. Further, the more than doubling of
the import share of “computer and information services” may be a
reflection of offshore outsourcing of these services. Further, a signif-
icant decline in the import share of telecommunications may be an
indication of a substantial cost reduction in providing these services
due to technological advances.
5.2.2 Rise of Trade in Information-Intensive Services:
Potential Explanations
In this subsection, we informally discuss some of the likely and intu-
itively plausible explanations for the growth of cross-border trade in
information-intensive services in the U.S. and globally.
First and foremost, the unprecedented advances in ICT have played
(and will continue to play) a pivotal role in the expansion of trade in
information-intensive services. In fact, according to some studies, ICT
advances contributed positively to the growth of trade in goods as well
as in services.7 There are direct and indirect channels through which
ICT advances can stimulate trade in information-intensive services. The
most direct way is by lowering the cost of communicating information or
transferring data. The low cost not only helps with the actual delivery
of the service but also with entry into the market in another country.
Further, there are indirect channels through which ICT contributes to
the growth of trade in information-intensive services. For example, ICT-
enabled service innovations such as geographically dispersed production
7Using bilateral trade data between the U.S. and 31 other countries, Freund and Wein-
hold [39] show that the Internet penetration in foreign countries has had a positive impact
on services trade. Freund and Weinhold [40] further show that use of the Internet also
contributes positively to the growth of merchandise trade. They argue that the Internet
stimulates exports by lowering the costs of entering the market. However, using data for
a sample of 98 countries that includes both developed and developing countries, Clarke
and Wallsten [34] find that Internet penetration has a significant positive effect only on
exports from developing to developed countries and not on exports to developing or from
developed to other developed and developing countries.
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of service components (of which service outsourcing is an example) and
assembly have tremendous implications for services trade.8 As Apte and
Mason [6] argued, the information-intensive services were most sus-
ceptible to such service disaggregation and international trade.9 They
proposed a four-way classification of activities within a service process:
informational actions, customer contact actions, material manipulation
actions, and other indirect actions. Analyzing various services based
on relative time allocated to these four actions, they hypothesized that
services in which most time is spent on informational actions (called
information-intensive services) with low need for physical presence and
customer contact and with separable symbolic manipulation were most
susceptible to globalization and, therefore, to international trade.
Second, the fact that there had been an important structural shift
toward information services in the U.S. economy was also responsible
for the increase in information-intensive services trade. Thus, the U.S. is
not only the largest producer of information services but also the largest
consumer of information services. Further, as living standards in other
countries improve, demand for services, in general, and information
services, in particular, in those countries increase. That also increases
demand for tradable services produced in the U.S. Some studies (for
example, [35, 55]) present evidence to show that standard of living,
measured by per capita income, in the trading partner countries has
significant positive effect on the flow of trade in information-intensive
services.
Third, the economic size and growth of the trading partners also
matter for trade in services, in general, and information-intensive ser-
vices, in particular [35, 39, 55].10 The range and complexity of economic
activities in those economies potentially create vast demand for a num-
ber of information-intensive services. To understand this potential for
demand creation, we use the illustration from Quinn [74], which shows
how the size and growth of manufacturing can create demand for a
8These innovations are a major part of the fundamental changes in services, collectively
known as service industrialization. For a discussion, see Karmarkar [49].
9Mithas and Whitaker [67] empirically show that information-intensive services have in fact
been disaggregated globally.
10Freund and Weinhold [39] also find evidence of a positive impact of growth on services
trade.
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Fig. 5.6 Interactive roles of services [74].
host of services.11 For example, as shown in Figure 5.6, manufacturing
is directly supported by value-added services such as financing, leas-
ing, and insurance; business services such as consulting, auditing, and
advertising; and distribution services such as wholesaling, retailing, and
repairing. These support services are further backed by infrastructure
services, government services, and personal services. Many of these sup-
port services, particularly the information-intensive services, can be
traded across borders.
Fourth, the deregulation of service industries at home and abroad
and liberalization of foreign trade and investment regimes in many
countries around the world also provide the impetus for growth in
services trade. Service industries are heavily regulated and, there-
fore, it is often very difficult to attract foreign investment and trade.
Recognizing the enhanced tradability of services due to technology,
many governments around the world (including governments in many
11We recognize that manufacturing is not the source of demand for most services. In fact, it
is quite possible to have an economy with very little manufacturing and mostly services.
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emerging market economies) have deregulated a number of information-
intensive services primarily to increase competition and gain efficiency.
Being in the forefront of technological advances, the U.S., in fact, has
already reaped the benefits by investing and trading in services with
those countries. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) also helps increase
trade in services primarily through affiliated trade.12
Finally, unlike in merchandise trade, language and culture are very
important in services trade. As Apte and Karmarkar [2] argued, for
consumer services that are information intensive, the topography of
the world trade and outsourcing will be strongly colored by language,
culture, and colonial history. In fact, the defining feature of this topog-
raphy is language and not mountains and oceans, and the language
barrier may well be the hardest thing to cross. Figure 5.7 presents the
Fig. 5.7 Distribution of different language speaking population by income (Modified from
Ref. [2]). Estimates of populations competent in selected languages, in categories of GNP
per capita.
12Mann and Civril [62] provide evidence in support of this.
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distribution of world population for five major languages into differ-
ent income ranges, measured by GNP per capita. It shows that the
world English market for services is unique in its size, geographic dis-
tribution, and, most importantly, in potential for trade. It is also one
of the most open markets. Spanish shares some of these features, but
the distribution being less extreme offers less opportunity for those in
poorer countries. For other major language groups concentrated in one
or a few countries, the potential for outsourcing and international trade
would be rather limited. This might well prove to be a boon for those
engaged in services in those countries, since they will not be subject to
the intense competition seen due to outsourcing and off-shoring in the
English-speaking and perhaps the Spanish-speaking world.
6
Drivers of Economic Evolution
and Sector Growth
6.1 Productivity
Productivity in the U.S. economy has increased for decades in manufac-
turing, and is now showing increases in many services as well [24, 46].
It is well understood that productivity growth creates a higher stan-
dard of living in an economy (e.g., [17]). Higher productivity allows for
higher levels of output for the same level of resource consumption, and
results in lower prices and higher consumption levels on average. In
addition, differential productivity growth rates are also a major reason
for changes in economic structure and sector sizes as well as for the
distribution of jobs and wages.
Productivity is itself a consequence of many decisions made in the
private and public sectors. We identify technology-driven “industrial-
ization” as a useful way of describing many of those underlying changes.
We will discuss this and other issues in subsequent sections.
Productivity growth differentials have long been identified as the
reason for the relative decline of manufacturing and the growth of ser-
vices. Baumol [17] showed how higher productivity in manufacturing
and correspondingly lower productivity growth in services would lead
to an increase in the costs of services, calling the phenomenon the “cost
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disease.” The same model showed that the manufacturing sector would
decline relative to services.
However, there are certain limitations to this model in terms of the
assumptions made. For example, the levels of demand for products and
services are assumed to stay in a fixed ratio. As a result, the model does
not seem to explain the earlier growth in manufacturing as occurred
during the Industrial Revolution, which would intuitively seem to cor-
relate with increasing productivity.
A more general model [53] resolved this question. In this model, an
economy consisted of heterogenous individuals (or entities) who both
consumed and produced. Given prices set by a Walrasian “auctioneer,”
so as to clear the market, they made independent choices on what to
produce and then allocated the resulting income to consumption. As
might have been expected, individuals chose to produce the goods or
services at which they were relatively most productive, in terms of
production quantities adjusted by the prices received. Thus, the model
endogenously determined employment choices, production quantities,
prices, sector sizes, and wealth distribution.
The model showed that higher productivity growth in one sector
resulted in larger quantities being produced and lower prices. How-
ever, the sector did not always decline in size in favor of the other
(lower productivity sector), as in Baumol’s model. If the market for
the sector’s output was at an early stage, then increased productiv-
ity caused relative growth in the sector. If, on the other hand, the
market was mature and demand was satiated, then higher productiv-
ity caused a relative decline in sector size. In other words, the relative
consequences of productivity growth depended on the level of demand
satiation and demand elasticity.
Since the 1970s, we have seen growth for the services sector rel-
ative to manufacturing for the U.S. economy. This growth in the
service sector as a whole has been attributed to low growth in service
productivity. At the same time, we are seeing information-intensive
services growing relative to physical services. This could again be due
to higher productivity growth in information-intensive services, but
now coupled with the appearance of new and emerging services for
which demand is growing (i.e., elasticity). Productivity effects are one
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credible explanation for both the relative growth of services against
manufacturing, and then within the service sector, for the growth of
information-intensive services relative to material or physical services.
The same productivity growth and demand satiation mechanisms
explain employment shifts. High productivity without market growth
(mature satiating markets) drives employment into other sectors. How-
ever, productivity growth in emerging and growing markets can show
employment gains in those sectors.
6.2 Industrialization
Productivity increases themselves are an aggregate result of many fac-
tors. It is reasonable to think of these collectively as industrialization.
By industrialization, we mean changes in the underlying processes of
production driven by the appearance and implementation of new tech-
nologies.1 In the small, this refers to changes in the way tasks and
processes are carried out in a firm. In the large, there can be substan-
tial changes in the way sectors and industries are organized.
In the manufacturing sector, industrialization was driven by a set
of complementary factors:
• The application of new sources of power such as water, steam,
and electricity,
• The mechanization and automation of processes to leverage
human ability,
• Improved precision and reliability in process operations,
• Reliable sources of inputs and materials of uniform quality,
• Increases in the efficiency of transportation and logistics
using rail, roads, and shipping,
• A process of standardization starting with products, going
to processes, and leading to mass production, and
• Precision of specification and measurement to support stan-
dardization.
The outcomes of industrialization included increases in productiv-
ity, mass cost-effective production, improved product quality, mass
1Some of the material in this section is drawn from Karmarkar [49].
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markets, increased consumer welfare and wealth, and a growing
“industrial” sector due to market growth.
All the driving factors for industrialization in manufacturing have
now appeared in information production processes as well. Clearly there
have been vast increases in basic processing capability. Correspond-
ingly, the ability to automate and leverage human capabilities in data
and information processing has increased. The increases in transporta-
tion efficiency for information that started with the radio, television,
and telephone have evolved to modern data communications systems
that integrate seamlessly with processing and storage resources, allow-
ing for end-to-end integration of information chains.
The standardization process for information products and services
can be thought of in stylized form as:
• Standardization of information representation in symbolic
form,
• Standardization of processes of production (e.g., printing),
storage (books), and processing (calculators, cash registers,
and computers),
• Standardization of processing and processes at the
machine level (punched cards, programmable machines, and
software), and
• Standardization of products and services (books and news-
papers, packaged software including operating systems,
data bases and applications, websites, and server-based
applications).
The standardization of information products has happened rather
quickly, but standardization of services is still evolving. We are now
seemingly in the middle of a new wave of standardization and produc-
tivity increases with service-oriented architectures (SOAs), syndication,
mash-ups, and web (cloud) services.
6.3 Technology and Process Change
Industrialization could well be thought of in large part as the creation
and application of new technologies. A basic impact of new technologies
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is simply increased processing power. Moore’s law (actually stated in
terms of the density of elements on silicon chips) projected that com-
puter processing capability would double every 18 months, and this
rate has held for over five decades. Similar improvements have applied
to the transportation and storage of information.
Another aspect of technology is the management of technology
development and implementation from scientific discoveries to inven-
tion, product development, and commercialization. This could be
thought of as the “push” aspect of technological development and of
industrialization. The impact of new technologies on service industri-
alization can be examined in terms of three ongoing processes:
(1) The application of new technologies to improve performance
in existing processes. An example is the invention of digital
cameras and their use in image capture. Another is the devel-
opment of software that leverages human effort (word pro-
cessing) or substitutes for it (online services).
(2) The creation of infrastructure and systems that improves
existing processes or enables new ways of executing certain
processes. An example would be the development of telecom-
munications and its application to business transactions.
(3) The reconstruction of information and service chains, enabled
or even forced due to the use of new technologies.
The decisions and actions underlying these processes occur in the firms
that develop, commercialize, and sell new technologies in the form of
new products and processes, as well as in the firms that use these
new technologies to create new businesses, ranging from infrastruc-
ture (telecommunications networks) to business services (hosting and
email) to technology products and services (hardware, software, and IT
services).
6.4 Design and Innovation
The designs of new services and innovations in existing services have
the potential for increasing the value delivered to customers. Of course,
design and innovation are highly correlated with new technological
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developments, but not necessarily so. For example, operational changes
such as improved queue management may not involve new technology,
or even any cost increase.
The result of improved service value in a sector is to cause a reallo-
cation of consumption toward the sector and a growth in that sector.
But again, once the design of the product of service stabilizes (e.g., with
the emergence of a dominant design concept), this effect can become
muted; or with sufficient improvement in value, demand could become
satiated. This effect is likely to be most visible in new and emerging
products and services.
6.5 Logistics and Distributed Production
The development of low-cost logistics allows the location of production
and maintenance activities to low-cost locations and outside sources.
This may or may not cause a productivity increase. In fact, it can entail
productivity decreases in the fundamental sense. However, the reduced
costs result in lowered price to customers, potential growth in market
share for individual firms, and growth for the entire sector.
Outsourcing of processes to third party providers often results in a
cost reduction for firms as well as productivity increases for the sector
as a whole. Typically, an outsourcing process-providing company will
have higher productivity than the buyers. Suppose a firm operates two
processes, and that the productivities of these parts are previously p1
and p2, so that the productivity of the overall process is p = p1 • p2.
Now suppose that the firm outsources one process and retains the other.
After outsourcing, p1 can be expected to increase so that the overall
productivity of the overall process also increases; this happens for all
the firms using the outsourced supplier. Of course, the effect of such
productivity gains may be either toward growth or decline of the sector,
as discussed earlier.
However, as the geographical distribution of operations crosses
national boundaries (off-shoring), there can be substantial reductions
in sector size. Efficient information logistics provision at a global level
has enabled the movement of information-intensive service processes to
almost anywhere in the world. Various sources [4, 6] have suggested
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that the impact of off-shoring on employment in the U.S. could affect
anywhere from 4% to 10% of service jobs in some way. However, it is
difficult to disentangle the many causes of job losses, including factors
such as automation, process reengineering, and (on-shore) outsourcing.
6.6 Demographics
The impact of demographics on economic evolution and structure is
complex with multiple aspects that we cannot fully explore here. At a
basic level, growth in population, absent constraints to growth, means
a bigger economy. Larger economies, with larger populations, also have
the potential for more complex industrial structures. For example, there
can be a much higher level of specialization, and much more variety of
products and services in the market. In other words, small populations
cannot be “broad spectrum” economies. One reason for this is that
economies of scale are not present. For example, small economies do
not have large automotive or aerospace sectors. At a more detailed
level, high production volumes also allow for specialized methods of
mass production, and job specialization within processes. Productivity
can be much higher for such processes. In addition, there may not
be room in small economies to support a large variety of products,
except perhaps in one or two specialized sectors (e.g., Belgium and
beer). Higher product and service variety also means higher value to
customers. This would generally mean an increase in the size of such a
sector.
On the other hand, large economies, especially when they are diverse
in terms of languages, cultures, and religions, may not be managed as
well internally and may expend a lot of energy in resolving internal
problems. Smaller economies, especially those that are more homoge-
nous linguistically and culturally, have the potential for highly directed
and strategic action. It is likely not accidental that the smaller, more
homogenous economies in Asia (Taiwan, South Korea) made faster
and earlier economic strides relative to some larger economies (India,
Indonesia).
The age distribution in the population has obvious impacts on sec-
tor sizes and economic structure. An aging population means higher
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demands for health care and financial services. Declining numbers of
children and young adults mean lower demand for educational services,
a major source of jobs and employment. Specific features of the age dis-
tribution such as the baby boom in the U.S., or the one-child policy in
China, can have large effects. In the case of the U.S., as baby boomers
retire, there will be a loss of experienced workers and managers from the
working population, and the relative proportion of experienced workers
will drop. A similar pattern is visible in most developed economies.
Historically, younger Americans have always been more educated
than older generations. However, that pattern is not holding2 in recent
years. For example, in 2003, the 25–29-year age group had a lower
level of educational attainment, in terms of high school graduation or
college graduation, than age groups up to age 50. The proportion in the
25–29-year age group with a college degree has remained flat at a level
around 30% since the mid-1970s. There are complex effects related to
aging and education that are not easy to unravel. On the one hand, jobs
will become available as baby boomers retire. But it may not be easy to
find individuals with the level of education and training that is needed
to fill the open jobs. In other words, there may be a matching problem
in labor markets that could become visible over the next decade. This
issue could be particularly important as the job mix in the economy
moves toward information-intensive and knowledge-intensive jobs.
2See Stoops [79].
7
The Consequences of Economic Evolution
7.1 Competition
The transition to an information-intensive economy is accompanied by
changes in market mechanisms and production processes in the small
and in the large. These have effects on the competitive landscape and
on the structure of the global-, regional-, and industry-sector levels of
the economy. The changes in the nature of competition are driven by
multiple factors operating on the buy side and the sell side as well as on
market mechanisms and market structures. Many of these changes are
most striking in terms of services, where technology-driven industrial-
ization is most prevalent, with the largest current and future impact.
7.1.1 Standardization and Commoditization
The automation of service processes including both backroom and front
offices has contributed to the standardization of services. Backroom
processes are increasingly similar for several reasons. The use of third-
party suppliers for software packages and systems integration leads to
similar or even identical processes. Even when customized or built
in house, functions tend to be carried out in the same way, even if
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the lines of code are different, simply because of similar professional
training, similar languages, the same databases, and the same compo-
nents and libraries. With front office and customer-facing systems that
are increasingly online and web enabled, there is much more rapid dif-
fusion of design and functionality. Software is easy to reverse-engineer
in terms of replicating functionality, look, and feel.
The early result is higher levels of standardization, which can help in
terms of creating mass markets and reduced cost of design, construc-
tion, sales, and delivery. However, there is also the threat of design
convergence becoming a slide to commoditization with a lack of differ-
entiation. This is quite visible in websites of all stripes, in every sector
from financial services to retail. Standardization and the difficulty in
differentiation lead to competition being more cost driven and therefore
intense.
7.1.2 Loss of Localization
Low-cost logistics and the creation of online customer interfaces acces-
sible from anywhere are leading to a reduction of local and regional
differentiation — the so-called “death of distance” (e.g., [30]). The
arena of competition for services that are accessible online can expand
to almost any geography. There may remain some degree of local-
ization based on language and culture [2, 47], since the topography
of information-intensive sectors is aligned to those rather than phys-
ical geography. There also may be other localizing factors such as
trust, brand, relationships, and familiarity. These operate more at the
customer interface than in business-to-business transactions, although
they are not absent there either. In the most basic backroom or
transaction-oriented processes, physical location may play no role and
may in fact be unknown to the customer. With the advances in SOA
methods and the increasing appearance of software-as-a-service (SaaS),
application service providers (ASPs), third-party web services, and so-
called cloud computing, location becomes truly irrelevant.
The distribution of service processes, as with supply chains for
goods, results in lower and similar production costs for all suppliers, and
also contributes to the standardization of processes addressed earlier.
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The intensity of competition is increased due to a larger arena as well as
cost reduction and leveling. Competition may be cost based and much
more intense, with more competitors. Although costs may reduce sub-
stantially, competition results in lower prices, and savings get passed
on to customers.
7.1.3 Low Entry Barriers and Low Scale Economies
Hardware and equipment costs are no longer barriers to entry into
information-intensive sectors. Software can occasionally be a barrier
but here, too, standardization and off-shore provision have reduced
costs. Access and remote delivery are no longer cost issues. As a result,
there are likely to be more entrants in a service sector, and standard-
ization also reduces the opportunities for differentiation.
Scale economies are less of a factor in building information-intensive
services in terms of hardware capacity for processing and communica-
tions. First of all, information-processing capacity is not only of low
cost but is also “scalable,” in that it is possible to start at a small
scale and add capacity incrementally as required. To a great extent, for
many firms, capacity can be rented as needed from service providers of
hosting, storage, and other web or “cloud” services. This is also true of
enterprise software and other functional software tools, the availability
of which continues to grow.
However, software and other pure information products display
economies of scale, due to the variability of production costs. Fixed
costs (or first copy costs) tend to be relatively high, while variable
(second copy) costs are often extremely low. There are indeed barri-
ers to entry for vendors of large software products such as operating
systems and enterprise systems.
Apart from entry, the nature of information chains also permits a
firm to occupy a relatively narrow slice of the delivery chain. In domi-
nating the early days of photography, Eastman Kodak not only made
film but delivered it to the end customer in a Kodak camera, provided
film development and printing services, and returned a reloaded camera
to the customer. The customer just took the picture — Eastman Kodak
did the rest. This was a great business model, which locked in customers
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but required an extreme level of vertical integration and investment. By
comparison, in the modern information-intensive world, there are many
examples (Kazaa, Skype, Hotmail, Google, Napster) of a relatively spe-
cialized service provided very quickly, initially by a small group with
relatively low investment levels.
7.1.4 Network Externalities and Installed Base Effects
Networks are a common feature of many information-intensive sectors,
starting with the underlying infrastructure of telecommunications to
the network aspects of consumer sites that involve many-to-many com-
munications and interactions. As is well known, the value of a network
is theoretically proportional to the square of the number of nodes in
the network. Therefore, the bigger the network, the larger is its value
to users. The basis for this effect is the observation that the number of
point-to-point or bilateral connections in a network with n entities or
nodes is proportional to the square of n. This creates an advantage to
first movers and also a barrier to entry, since a user choosing between
networks will usually favor the larger incumbent over a new entrant.
There is vast literature on the economics of networks and network com-
petition (e.g., [77]).
In addition to network externalities driven by the number of con-
nections, the installed base of users of a technology can have other
positive effects for the technology. One consequence is the creation of
economies of scale in support and maintenance of the software. Another
is increased diffusion of information about the product through word
of mouth and online communications.
7.1.5 Differentiation and Niches
While commoditization is one common consequence of industrializa-
tion, increased differentiation of certain services or the creation of niche
services can also occur in certain sectors. First, lower costs of entry
allow for smaller scale enterprises and niche creation. The increased
reach made possible by low-cost information logistics and the Internet
also allows a provider to reach a specialized narrow market that might
not have been otherwise possible. Ongoing operating costs of automated
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service process capacity or holding information content inventories are
low. The horizon over which sales occur can be stretched out, again
allowing for niche markets.
Differentiating automated services can be easier in certain cases.
Bundling services, customizing them, or creating different services
processes (to provide variety) are made easier by information tech-
nologies, and are becoming even easier due to new technologies such as
SOAs.
7.2 Services Trade and Off-Shoring
For most countries, services trade volume is relatively stable at around
15–20% of total trade. The United Kingdom, Spain, and India are
exceptions, with services trade at more than 25% of total trade volume.
At the other end of the spectrum, China and Mexico have less than 10%
of their trade volume in services. Additionally, for most countries, ser-
vices trade is dominated by physical services such as transportation,
which tends to track product trade, and travel, which is driven by
tourism and product trade. Two countries that are major exceptions in
this respect are the U.S. and India. For the U.S., while travel and trans-
portation are indeed large components, royalties and licenses, financial
services, and other business services are also major service exports.
In fact, by 2006, “business, professional, and technical services” had
become the largest export item from the U.S. among private services.
Its share in total exports of private services from the U.S. was 21.6%,
while that of “travel and transportation” was 21.4% and “royalties and
license fees” was 17.7%. By 2009, these shares were 24.1%, 19.4%, and
18.6%, respectively. On the import side, too, business services, financial
services, government services, royalties and licenses, and computer and
information services are all major components. The growth in these
information-intensive components has been substantial for the U.S. in
both absolute and relative terms. For example, financial service exports
have more than tripled in the last 10 years.
For India, the top two service trade categories are computer and
information services and business services. This pattern is consistent
with the growth in outsourcing and off-shoring in information-intensive
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industry sectors. This increase in information-intensive trade for India
has been extremely rapid, with about a tenfold increase in the last
decade.
The global pattern of services trade resembles that of trade in goods,
since physical services dominate information-intensive services for most
countries. However, the pattern for information-intensive services is dif-
ferent. While trade in products is affected by distance, trade in informa-
tion services is not. Rather, language and culture play a significant role
[47]. India’s growth in information-intensive services trade is feasible
due to the presence of large service markets in English-speaking coun-
tries such as the U.S. and United Kingdom.
In principle, the low cost of logistics for trade, and the ability to
“modularize” information-intensive services and content production,
could be expected to lead to higher volumes of trade in information-
intensive services. This growth is likely to be higher in the largest
information services markets. As pointed out by Karmarkar [47] and
Apte and Karmarkar [2], the largest geographically distributed informa-
tion services market is that composed of countries with large English-
speaking populations. In fact, the English world is unique in this
respect.
7.3 Wage Distribution
Apte et al. [4] showed that there were significant wage differentials
across information and noninformation sectors, with the average wage
in the former sectors being perhaps 40% higher than the average in the
latter. In our updated analysis (Section 4), we confirmed that these dif-
ferentials continue to exist. There are several possible explanations for
these differences. One leading factor is that the returns to education are
larger in information-intensive sectors. For example, the educational
preparation required for entry-level jobs in many physical services (such
as food services) is less than that required in information-intensive
services (such as clerical work). Furthermore, higher levels of education
do not necessarily lead to advancement in many physical services (e.g.,
freight, warehousing). On the other hand, advanced education has
significant returns in many information-intensive services (financial
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services, education, professional services). Thus, a shift in employment
to information-intensive jobs appears to raise the average wage level
in services. It also increases inequality in income levels.
A more complex, more fundamental mechanism is that related to
productivity and sector growth. Karmarkar and Rhim [53] showed that
productivity growth in a sector that is also growing in terms of market
size can lead to greater income inequality in an economy. This may well
be the situation for the information services sector. However, we are
not as yet aware of any empirical validation of this mechanism.
7.4 Convergence and Sector Restructuring1
The terms “convergence” and “digital convergence” are widely used to
denote the blurring of boundaries between information-intensive sec-
tors. It is useful to break down the concept of convergence further to
understand its impact on different stages of information production and
delivery. We can identify the following aspects of convergence, which
are interrelated:
• Convergence in form (digitization),
• Convergence in logistics (storage and transportation),
• Convergence in processing (hardware),
• Convergence in work tools (desktops, laptops, workstations),
• Convergence in consumption (consumer appliances),
• Convergence in usage and behavior (in business and for
consumers), and
• Convergence in content and services (blurring of product,
service, and industry lines).
The first of these requires little explication. All types of informa-
tion are capable of representation in digital form. This leads imme-
diately to the reality of converged logistics, with the common means
of storing and transporting all forms of information in digital form.
Similarly, the tools for processing information are very much the same
in terms of hardware. Software is often the same at some levels (e.g.,
1The material in this section is partly drawn from Karmarkar [50].
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operating systems, network management, middleware, and server level
industrial applications). However, it is also often specialized by the
eventual use of the information (e.g., audio versus video processing on
a desktop or different end uses). There, too, are often similar compo-
nents and methodologies involved in its development, and the degree
of specialization across sectors has reduced. For example, websites for
diverse companies in different sectors can be built using similar tools
and techniques.
So far, we have addressed the supply side of information. Turning
to end users of information, we can see a process of convergence occur-
ring in the tools that are used for working with information. The same
desktops and laptops serve workers in many diverse industries. The
differences between workstations, terminals, and desktops, which were
mainly a matter of processing power, have almost disappeared. Those
between desktops, laptops, and notebooks are disappearing. The dif-
ferences now have more to do with the work environment and mobility,
rather than differences across job types and industry sectors. In service
delivery to consumers, there is likely to be some specialization. So it
may be that kiosks at airports will always be different from ATMs or
automated vending machines, often due to different physical require-
ments. Even here, the core technologies are very similar.
Finally, at the level of the end consumer of information, there is
an increasing degree of convergence in the appliances used. There are
indeed things that will not converge, in the sense that an appliance
needs to deliver analog information in the form of vision and sound,
and to provide an input mechanism to capture speech, gestures, or
digital inputs (fingers in this case). However, all of these can now be
bundled into one small box. In 2009, the Apple iPhone was the leading
example of this convergence, with many other devices close behind.
Looking a bit more closely at this phenomenon, we can identify
a sequence of different kinds of convergence. The first is, of course
“digital,” or convergence in form and representation. This, in turn,
leads to the convergence in logistics and processing methods mentioned
earlier. This convergence includes software and hardware assets, since
the same methods and tools can be used in different sectors. The com-
monality and convergence in equipment and appliances extend to the
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user and the consumption of information, not just their production and
delivery. As a result, there is a form of convergence on the supply side
of information sectors, where the same companies now play the same
role across sectors. An obvious example is the use of telecommunica-
tions for transportation of digital material. As a result of convergence
in the appliances used in consumption, there is a kind of convergence
in behavior, where formerly distinct use patterns start to overlap.
7.4.1 Vertical De-integration and Lateral Dominance
On the supply side, information-intensive industry sectors, whether
products or services, were separated and often dominated by the media
used for storage and distribution. This effectively separated the music
business more or less completely from the publishing business. Even
the frequency of distribution of different types of media led to dif-
ferent industry sectors, so that newspapers were very distinct from
weekly news magazines or books, as examples. The economics of stor-
age, distribution, and transportation were highly scale dependent. As
a result, many information-intensive sectors were dominated vertically
by a few companies. This was the case with newspapers, television,
and telephone service. However, such structures cannot survive “con-
vergence.” The general consequence is a shift from vertical dominance
and integration driven by distribution economics to lateral dominance
and integration based on technologies and assets.
While lateral strength and integration are a general trend, there is
considerable variation in the strategies that we see. Firms like Google,
Yahoo, Amazon, Microsoft, and NTT DoCoMo have exploited their
positions to expand laterally, although to varying degrees and with
differing models and strategies. On the other hand, many telecommu-
nication companies seem to be slower in recognizing the opportunities
that were, and still are, open to them.
It remains to be seen as to what mix of lateral and vertical struc-
tures will eventually survive, and which firms will be the dominant
players. However, the strongest contenders appear to be the server-
based, consumer-oriented companies that have built successful platform
models and strong brands.
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7.4.2 Direct-to-Customer and Open Marketplaces
One of the models permitted by the economics of information logistics
is the enhanced ability to go directly to the customer, bypassing tradi-
tional intermediaries. An example of this would be a writer or novelist
who decides to publish his or her work online, rather than take the
usual route through an editor, publisher, and distribution channel. An
extreme version of this would be an author who, for whatever reason,
is able to connect to a large portion of the market for his or her work,
who could then simply inform their readers about a new work, with
instructions on how to access (download) it from a dedicated website.
This could work with some combination of a loyal audience, a large
audience, and a sufficiently large flow of new material. A small mod-
ification is the use of a third party site that does not raise the cost
of distribution much and is focused on certain types of content. For
example, many software packages are sold through such sites. A fur-
ther variation is the use of a web-based distributor, although, in this
case, the cost penalty (the portion captured by the intermediary) can
rise quite sharply. An example is publication through Amazon’s Kindle
platform. Today, this is still a proprietary and relatively closed, con-
trolled channel, which takes a substantial portion of the gross revenue.
Yet, the actual cost of the channel is low, the channel’s capacity is
high, and the speed at which the product reaches the market is high.
Such models can clearly work with almost any kind of good or service,
as long as it can be searched effectively on the web, purchased online,
and delivered remotely. The ability to reach even small market seg-
ments using the low-cost search and delivery modes available with the
Internet is sometimes called the “long tail” phenomenon.
One of the most effective routes to access markets directly has been
through the open auctions and “classified” marketplaces, such as eBay
and Craigslist. These platforms have high fixed costs but low operating
costs, and can scale up to very high capacities, so that the cost per
transaction is also very low, and the search and match capabilities are
very high. Here, the market maker (e.g., eBay) has several alternative
ways to earn revenues on the transactions that are carried out. The
revenue sources could include some or all listing fees, transaction fees
(fixed or proportional), and advertising.
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A more business-oriented version of the same concept is the online
mall, where the customer accesses and orders goods through one
branded website, but the inventories are with another supplier. Actual
order fulfillment may be done by the site or by the other supplier.
Amazon is a leading example of this model.
7.4.3 Barter and Community Sites
One of the exchange modes enabled by technology is barter and
exchange of goods and services without any monetary exchange. Some
of this activity is illegal, as when information goods are shared without
the right to do so. Some of the sites that used to facilitate this kind of
sharing have been significantly curtailed in operation (Kazaa) or shut
down (Napster). However, technologies that can be used for file sharing
such as Bit Torrent will continue to survive, although sites facilitating
such sharing continue to be shut down (e.g., Pirate Bay). In other
cases, there are many content-sharing sites, which limit themselves to
legal downloads of nonprotected content. YouTube is probably one of
the best known of these. The barter mode here is not a unit-for-unit
exchange. However, it is, in effect, a pool of shared content to which
many contribute and from which many more consume.
Social networking and community sites like Facebook and Twitter
are similar in a way, in that they provide entertaining and appealing
ways for individuals to spend time in communication and social trans-
actions that substitute for other forms of media, entertainment, and
social activity. For example, it is entirely plausible that online social
networking will reduce the number of people joining traditional clubs.
Such sites represent a dangerous direction for a broad spectrum
of commercial interests, since the value in these transactions is not
easily captured. It appears that advertising revenue is one way to
“monetize” the activity, but it is clearly not directly related to the
value of the transactions. The threat to commercial activity is quite
substantial, since the time spent on such sites takes away from other
fee-based and revenue-producing consumption. It is likely that many
traditional businesses have been affected in terms of time being shifted
from them to these sites and activities. The pattern of allocation of time
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by consumers to different forms of entertainment and social activity is
changing rapidly.
7.5 Organizational Restructuring
Organizational changes arise from two directions. First, changes at the
industry level also require corresponding changes in organizations. For
example, as online channels start to substitute for traditional channels,
a new internal structure is required to manage the new channels. Over
time, it is possible that the traditional channels shrink and perhaps dis-
appear completely — this is likely to happen in some publishing sectors.
For example, it has largely happened in legal publishing. There may
be several concurrent changes in the nature of the published product
itself. In legal publishing, the shift has been marked, as the product
has gone from (for example) publication in a paper-and-book form to
a searchable database. Apart from the change in the nature of the core
document, there can also be changes in supporting information. Instead
of legal notes being added to the base document, the end customer can
use a search engine to identify related cases and legal precedents. As
a result, the core processes of publication shift from being knowledge
based to being oriented toward electronic capture, collection, and deliv-
ery. The resulting changes in organizational structure are quite substan-
tial. In the legal publishing sector, the paper-based printing processes
have completely disappeared in certain firms, along with the people,
the printing presses, inventories of books, and the physical warehous-
ing and transportation systems. In addition, many legal professionals
who worked on the enhancement of published content are now gone,
while the expertise related to electronic publishing processes has been
added.
The second driving force behind organization change arises
internally. The same kinds of forces that cause changes in the
larger industry sectors also apply inside organizations. For exam-
ple, information-intensive processes inside organizations are subject to
change, and these changes are reflected in organizational structure. For
example, in the U.S., organizations across a wide range of industries
are changing toward having fewer layers of hierarchy, wider spans of
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control, and reduced colocation of workers [52]. Many more changes
are occurring due to restructuring of processes and operations down to
the most atomic levels of work.
7.6 Continuing Evolution and New Developments
The shift to the information economy will continue for decades and at
a very deep level, extending to tasks, jobs, and processes as well as
organizations, sectors, and economies. Many sectors have already been
transformed by these shifts, others are in the process of change, while
some are yet to see major changes, although they are inevitable. In some
cases, sectors have grown in size and importance. Telecommunications
is a leading example in information logistics; web and infrastructure
services, including cloud computing, are others. So-called “big data”
and the business analytics sector continue to show growth. Some other
sectors have mainly seen a process of substitution, or partial trans-
formation. In retailing, search and e-commerce have had an impact on
the customer choice and purchasing process, but, of course, distribution
and delivery will always remain critical. Then there are some industries
where the changes are not merely substitution, but substantial loss of
sector size and value. Music and consumer imaging are two early exam-
ples, and there will be others, where the physical media at the core of
a sector are replaced by digital logistics.
Apart from changes in existing sectors, there is also the prospect
of the emergence of entirely new forms of economic activity, due to
technology-driven innovation that has been labeled “nondestructive
creation” [22]. One category of essentially new services is that of social
networking and communications. Another is that of search; yet another
category is location-based services.
In addition to these pure information service categories, we expect
substantial growth at the interface of online technologies and physical
automation. An early example is the use of Radio Frequency Iden-
tification (RFID) for object identification, as well as data collection
and transfer. A second major category is that of sensors and sensor
networks, today in applications ranging from monitoring to security.
These are natural extensions of the information logistics system. The
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ability to address a vast universe of objects (the “internet of things”)
will continue to expand the online world from screens and appliances
to practically any object of value. The next step in this evolution is a
much larger role for control and execution, with a combination of cen-
tralized and dispersed intelligence. There are hundreds if not thousands
of such applications, ranging from large intelligent systems (smart grids,
intelligent roadway systems) to local applications such as home enter-
tainment, home security, digital environments, and intelligent personal
assistants.
At the end of the day, the important consequences of these complex
changes will be reflected in terms of the growth and distribution of
value, jobs, and wages. There is not much room for growth for the
service sector as a whole. However, we expect the shift to information-
intensive activities to continue for at least a couple of decades in terms
of both value and employment. In sum, information-intensive services
will not only remain the dominant portion of the U.S. economy, but
also will grow to occupy a larger share of the whole.
8
Summary, Conclusions, and Future Research
This work has presented a longitudinal perspective of a major trend in
the U.S. economy toward becoming information intensive. This study
followed and extended previous work on this subject by Machlup [60,
61], Porat [73], Huber and Rubin [43], Apte and Nath [7, 8], and Apte
et al. [4]. In the last article and here, unlike the previous studies, we
broke down GDP further into product- and service-related outputs.
This added an important dimension toward understanding the evolu-
tion of the economy, since the trends toward services and information
are not the same, but are correlated. Furthermore, we discussed not
only GDP trends, but also examined the impact on jobs, employment,
and wages. In addition, we looked at trends in information-related
trade, which is likely to become an increasingly important issue for
the U.S. in the future.
One major conclusion from our work is that the U.S. economy is now
truly an “information economy.” Although the share of information-
intensive sectors has not increased after 2000, it has not declined sub-
stantially either, despite the shock of the 2001 recession. The U.S.
can also be described as an “information service economy,” with the
information-intensive services sector being the largest component of
GDP in the U.S. The total wage bill in information-intensive sectors has
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exceeded that in material-intensive sectors for a decade already. Fur-
thermore, after 2000, the share of jobs (number of FTE) attributable
to information-intensive services has overtaken that in physical and
material-intensive services for the first time in recent history. While the
recent back-to-back recessions in the U.S. have caused a pause in the
shift of GDP to information-intensive sectors, they may well accelerate
the trend in employment and wage distribution. We would conjecture
that, as the U.S. economy recovers (which may happen only slowly),
the trends will reestablish themselves.
There is a complex set of factors and drivers that underlie these
changes. A traditional explanation has been the differential changes in
productivity across sectors. While this remains valid, we noted that
market maturity or newness, and the potential for growth or the lack
thereof, must be factored in as well (e.g., [53]). When underlying pro-
ductivity changed, we discussed technology-driven industrialization as
an important microeconomic factor that creates those changes. Demo-
graphic shifts are likely to be another important factor, especially inso-
far as they are correlated with educational attainment.
Finally, we discussed the consequences of the evolution to an infor-
mation economy. This was again a vast topic and we only summa-
rized some of the main issues. There are substantial implications for
competition, both national and global, and also for the structure of
industries that are information intensive. Some of these changes are
visible, as with financial services and entertainment; others are still in
process and may take many years — but they are inexorable. In other
recent research, we had investigated several other closely related topics,
including the link between capital investment in information technol-
ogy and employment [68], international trade in services [9], service
industrialization [49], globalization [2], operations in the information
economy [51], and the effect of productivity changes on sector growth
and decline [53]. We also are continuing to work on topics related to this
study, including its extension beyond 2007 and the study of sector-level
changes in terms of GNP, employment, and business structure. The
opportunities for research on these topics are unlimited, ranging from
improved modeling of information-intensive processes [3, 5] to analysis
of sector structure and competition.
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